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Jury Nullification Within the Rule of Law
Darryl K. Brown*
The jury has been the subject of a resurgence of scholarly
and popular interest in recent years, partly in response to sev-
eral high-profile criminal trials and civil jury damage awards. 1
* Assistant Professor, University of Dayton School of Law. Special
thanks to my colleague Rich Saphire and to Laurie Dechery of the Minnesota
Law Review, who commented extensively on earlier drafts, and to Barbara
Glesner Fines and other participants in a workshop at the 1996 Central
States Law School Association meeting, where I presented a version of this
paper and received helpful comments.
1. See, e.g., JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY (1994) (examining the
role of the jury as providers of "common sense" to the trial system); NORMAN J.
FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JURORS' NOTIONS OF THE LAW (1995)
(discussing the role of the jury in the legal system); Darryl K Brown, The Role of
Race in Jury Impartiality and Venue Transfers, 53 MD. L. REV. 107 (1994)
(discussing the overlap and conflict between venue and jury "representa-
tiveness"); Laurie L. Levenson, Change of Venue and the Role of the Criminal
Jury, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1533 (1993) (discussing the effect of a change of
venue in selecting a jury); Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification,
82 VA. L. REV. 253 (1996) (examining the role, costs and benefits of jury nulli-
fication); Colleen P. Murphy, Integrating the Constitutional Authority of Civil
and Criminal Juries, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 723 (1993) (suggesting a theory
of jury authority under the Constitution); Anne Bowen Poulin, The Jury: The
Criminal Justice System's Different Voice, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1377 (1994)
(discussing the role of the jury in providing a human voice to counteract the
rigid rationality of law); Symposium, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1249 (1996) (a jury
symposium); cf Laura Gaston Dooley, Our Juries, Our Selves: The Power,
Perception and Politics of the Civil Jury, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 325 (1995)
(focusing on civil jury). For legislative interest in the jury, see infra note 2.
For popular commentary, see Jury Nullification, N.J.L.J., Jan. 22, 1996, at 26
(editorial against nullification); Matthew J. Moran, Ensuring Verdicts Based
on Law, CI. DAILY L. BULL., Mar. 18, 1996, at 6 (retired judge criticizing
nullification by urging retrial if a judge finds that jury did not follow instruc-
tions).
In recent years, several high-profile trials have been subject to wide-
spread media coverage, these include the acquittals of Washington, D.C.
Mayor Marion Barry, the Los Angeles police officers who beat Rodney King,
and O.J. Simpson. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME:
VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TIALS (1995) (discussing several well-
publicized trials including, in addition to those just listed, Dan White's man-
slaughter conviction for killing San Francisco Mayor George Moscone and Su-
pervisor Harvey Milk; El Sayyid Nosair's trial for the murder of Rabbi Meir
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One part of the controversy among scholars, the popular press,
and even legislators is the propriety of nullification verdicts by
criminal juries.2 Jury nullification, defined as a jury's ability
to acquit a criminal defendant despite finding facts that leave
no reasonable doubt about violation of a criminal statute,3 is
disfavored in large part because it seems to undermine the rule
of law.' Juries that nullify are usually presumed to base their
verdicts on illicit bias, personal disagreement with democrati-
cally enacted statutes, or, at best, private moral convictions
that contradict the law.' When jurors enter a verdict in con-
Kahane; the prosecution of Lemrick Nelson for the death of Yankel Rosen-
baum; and Mike Tyson's rape trial).
2. See FINKEL, supra note 1, at 19 (noting the positive and negative as-
pects of nullification); Alan W. Scheflin & Jon M. Van Dyke, Merciful Juries:
The Resilience of Jury Nullification, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 165, 175 (1991)
(describing renewed grass roots interest in nullification, including legislative
proposals in nine states to instruct juries on their nullification power, and
concluding that "[tlhe jury nullification movement is more active now than at
any previous period"). For legislative activity on jury nullification power, see
M. Kristine Creagan, Note, Jury Nullification: Assessing Recent Legislative
Developments, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1101, 1115-22 (1993) (summarizing
bills or proposed constitutional amendments in seven states in 1991 that
would have informed juries of their nullification power); Pamela Martineau,
Assembly Rejects Jury Nullification Measure, METRO. NEWS ENTERPRISE,
Apr. 10, 1996, at 9 (detailing bill that would have informed juries in misde-
meanor trials of nullification power).
3. See KENT GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY 360 (1987)
(defining nullification); Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black
Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 700 (1995) (same).
For a recent judicial definition and discussion of jury nullification, see People
v. Wright, 645 N.Y.S.2d 275 (Sup. Ct. 1996).
I use nullification here in its narrow and traditional sense, which refers
only to criminal court verdicts of acquittal. Only acquittal verdicts cannot be
reversed or corrected, and thus only in those instances has the jury fully and
determinatively controlled the legal outcome. Therefore, verdicts for convic-
tion are not nullification, properly understood, although they may be deliber-
ate efforts to determine a case in contravention of the law. But see FINKEL,
supra note 1, at 27-38 (describing deliberately incorrect verdicts for conviction
as "vengeful nullification"). Incorrect convictions can be overturned on ap-
peal. Additionally, civil jury verdicts do not nullify law, because their ver-
dicts, whether for or against liability, can be reversed.
4. See Butler, supra note 3, at 705 ("The idea that jury nullification un-
dermines the rule of law is the most common criticism of the doctrine."); see
also, e.g., United States v. Perez, 86 F.3d 735, 736 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating jury
nullification "is lawless").
5. See, e.g., United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1190 (1st Cir.
1993) (characterizing nullification as occasions when "jurors... choose to flex
their muscles, ignoring both law and evidence in a gadarene rush to acquit");
Butler, supra note 3, at 705 (noting concern that nullification threatens "self-
government" and "democratic principles"); id. at 709 (noting similar criticisms
by a federal judge); Phillip B. Scott, Jury Nullification: An Historical Perspec-
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travention of what the law authorizes and requires, they sub-
vert the rule of law and subject citizens-defendants, wit-
nesses, victims, and everyone affected by criminal justice ad-
ministration-to power based on the subjective predilections of
twelve individuals. They affect the rule of men, not law.6
Nullification has more support among academics than
among judges7 or the popular press, where criticism of per-
ceived nullification verdicts has reemerged in the wake of sev-
eral well publicized acquittals.' Yet even among scholars who
tive on a Modern Debate, 91 W. VA. L. REv. 389, 420 (1989) (arguing nullifica-
tion subverts democratic processes).
6. Cf Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) ("The gov-
ermnent of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of
laws, and not of men."); MODEL CODE OF PROF. REsP. EC 7-1 (1980) ("In our
government of laws and not of men, each member of our society is entitled to
have his conduct judged and regulated in accordance with the law. . . ."); see
also Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV.
781, 809 (1989) ("The point of 'the Rule of Law, not of individuals' is that the
rules are supposed to rule.... [JMudges, police, administrators ... are to be
rule-bound, merely instrumental functionaries.").
7. The vast majority of case law condemns nullification as "lawless," see,
e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984) (implying in dicta that
nullification is a "lawless decision" equivalent to "arbitrariness" and "caprice");
United States v. Perez, 86 F.3d 735, 736 (7th Cir. 1996) (characterizing jury nul-
lification as "lawless"), or the first step to "anarchy." See, e.g., United States v.
Krzyske, 836 F.2d 1013, 1021 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 832 (1988)
(approving a judge's refusal to instruct the jury on its nullification power);
United States v. Trujillo, 714 F.2d 102, 105-06 (11th Cir. 1983) (stating that a
jury instruction of the power of nullification invites juries to ignore the court
and apply their own version of the law); State v. McClanahan, 510 P.2d 153,
159 (Kan. 1973) (denying a request for a jury instruction on the power of nul-
lification); Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 2, at 169-70 & nn.15-20 (citing
cases against nullification). But see United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d
1113, 1130-37 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (disapproving a nullification instruction, but
approving nullification if jury was not instructed on it). See also Christopher
B. Daly, Barry Judge Castigates Four Jurors: Evidence of Guilt Was
"Overwhelming," Jackson Tells Forum, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1990, at Al
(noting federal district Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson's criticism of perceived
nullification by jury deciding the prosecution of D.C. Mayor Marion Barry,
over which Jackson presided); Moran, supra note 1, at 6 (describing the view
of a retired state judge).
For views of two trial judges who largely endorse jury nullification, see
United States ex rel. McCann v. Adams, 126 F.2d 774, 776 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 317
U.S. 269 (1942) and Jack B. Weinstein, Considering Jury "Nullification":
When May and Should a Jury Reject the Law To Do Justice, 30 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 239 (1993).
8. Though this Article will sometimes use the term "nullification" as if
those outside the jury could identify such a verdict, it is worth remembering
that such descriptions are more accurately labeled "apparent" or "presumptive
nullification," because nonjurors never know for sure whether a not-guilty
verdict was an act of nullification, at least not unless the jurors explicitly as-
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endorse jury nullification, the power is understood as some-
thing that occurs outside of law. Employing a term that con-
tinues to appear in the case law,9 Roscoe Pound described nul-
lification as "[j]ury lawlessness," although he nevertheless saw
it as "the great corrective of law in its actual administration."
0
Kent Greenawalt has suggested that "[n]ullification is logically
incompatible with applying the law," even though the "ends of
justice" may require it, in which case a juror "must call on his
own, individual sense of justice" to trump legal rules.1 Moral
considerations outside of law, in other words, may compel one,
justifiably, to ignore the law.12 More recently, Professor Paul
Butler published a provocative article urging black jurors to
nullify some prosecutions of African American defendants for
nonviolent crimes. 3 Butler advocates nullification as an op-
positional strategy to confront pervasive racial inequities of the
criminal justice system. He concedes that "[tihere is no ques-
tion that jury nullification is subversive of the rule of law" but
argues it is nonetheless "morally justified" in some cases and
justified because it "serve[s] a higher calling than law: jus-
tice."' 4
sert so after the trial. Usually, we simply presume nullification from our own
conclusion that the state's evidence seemed overwhelming and the law's appli-
cation clear. But the definition of nullification requires that jurors themselves
find facts that violate the statute, and then refuse to apply the statute.
9. See, e.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695; Perez, 86 F.3d at 736.
10. Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 18
(1910); see also W. Neil Brooks & Anthony N. Doob, Justice and the Jury, 31
J. SOC. ISSUEs 171, 172 (1975) (describing the jury as "fundamentally a politi-
cal institution" with the power to "construe or ignore a relevant rule of law in
a case in which its application would not be in accord with the [prevailing]
notions of justice and fairness"); Alan Scheflin & Jon Van Dyke, Jury Nullifi-
cation: The Contours of a Controversy, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn
1980, at 51, 88 (arguing nullification is necessary to protect law).
11. GREENAWALT, supra note 3, at 363-66.
12. Judicial accounts supporting nullification generally take the same ap-
proach. See, e.g., Adams, 126 F.2d at 776 (claiming jury acquittals temper
law's "rigor by the mollifying influence of current ethical conventions"); Wein-
stein, supra note 7, at 252.
13. See Butler, supra note 3.
14. Id. at 706, 723; see also id. at 715 ("I have more faith in the average
black juror's idea of justice than I do in the idea that is embodied in the 'rule
of law.' ").
For other scholars endorsing nullification but characterizing it as in con-
travention of the rule of law, see Poulin, supra note 1, at 1380, 1383, 1399-
402; Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 10, at 56, 88-89. See also Scheflin &
Van Dyke, supra note 2, at 165-66 n.2 & 166 n.3 (listing numerous articles for
and against nullification).
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Even among supporters, then, nullification is justified by
acknowledging the limits of the rule of law, in which the appli-
cation of general rules to specific cases sometimes yields unsat-
isfactory results.' 5 To achieve one of law's ends-justice-we
must sometimes abandon law's means, such as rule applica-
tion. Like equity, 6 nullification is one way, under this ap-
proach, to correct the imperfections of the rule of law and,
when wisely used, to achieve justice in an individual case that
rule application would not achieve. 17  The disagreement be-
tween supporters and opponents of nullification verdicts, then,
is not over whether such verdicts fit within the rule of law, but
whether such "lawless" verdicts are necessary to achieve good
results that law and existing institutions cannot.' 8 More sim-
ply, the debate is whether jury lawlessness does more harm
than good.9
15. See Butler, supra note 3, at 707 (discussing legal realism's "implicit
endorsement" of nullification on the belief that "no general principle of law
can lead to justice in every case").
16. See Lawrence B. Solum, Equity and the Rule of Law, in NOMOS
XXXVI: THE RULE OF LAw 120 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994) (discussing the conflict
between equity and the rule of law).
17. See, e.g., Poulin, supra note 1, at 1380, 1383 (arguing the jury speaks
"with a different voice--one independent of the rules of law" and provides
needed "relief from the unremitting rigor of the rule of law... [and] the ideal
of a system of abstract laws"); id. at 1400 (finding that nullification helps me-
diate "the rigidity of the law").
18. One exception is George Fletcher's brief discussion of nullification in
his book on the Bernhard Goetz trial. In reference to justification and neces-
sity doctrine issues he discusses with reference to Goetz's defense, Fletcher
suggests that, while "nullification seems to stand in conflict with the rule of
law," it should instead be seen as "complet[ing] the law, when necessary, by
recognizing principles of justification that go beyond the written law."
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE
LAW ON TRIAL 154-55 (1988). Thus, an acquittal in light of justification or ne-
cessity arguments is more accurately understood as "completing and perfect-
ing the positive law recognized by the courts and the legislature" than as nul-
lifying it. Id. at 155. This Article in part develops Fletcher's idea and
expands it beyond the reconciliation of criminal prohibitions with only such
defenses.
19. Compare Kristen K. Sauer, Informed Conviction: Instructing the Jury
About Mandatory Sentencing Consequences, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1254-56(1995) (arguing nullification is a check on the imperfections of legislatures,
which have institutional problems that slow or prevent modification of crimi-
nal law, and can only draft rules that are over- and underinclusive; nullifica-
tion also checks executive officials such as prosecutors whose law-application
decisions may be affected by bias or career-advancement motivations), with
Scott, supra note 5, at 419-23 (arguing nullification is used instead to subvert
democratic decisionmaking by implementing jury views of "policy or morality"
and "political agendas" that are "lost in legislatures").
1997] 1153
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Oddly, given the centrality of rule-of-law arguments in the
debate, discussions about nullification often occur with no ac-
knowledgment that our conception of the rule of law has been
considerably revised in recent decades and has, at least for
many scholars and lawyers, largely shed the unpersuasive
formalist and positivist premises on which descriptions of nul-
lification are often based. As a result, we have no account of
jury nullification that fits within a contemporary conception of
the rule of law.
Juries at one time explicitly possessed the power to judge
the law as well as the facts and thus to enter a nullification
verdict. The long-running debate over a jury's authority to dis-
regard or second-guess judges' instructions and other sources
of law was one that juries won at least through the eighteenth
century.20 When the tide turned against that authority and
judges reserved for themselves the authority to determine the
law (roughly the same era, interestingly, in which they took for
themselves the task of constitutional review),21 arguments
made to justify removing from juries their power to judge the
law were basically rule-of-law arguments. That is, as elabo-
rated below, 22 judges increasingly emphasized law as an objec-
tively determinable set of rules that stood in contrast to the
arbitrary whims of individuals, whether citizen-jurors or sov-
ereign rulers. One finds this idea as early as 1835, when Jus-
tice Story denied that jurors had a "right to decide the law ac-
cording to their own notions," 23 and declared "it is the duty of
the jury to follow the law, as it is laid down by the court."24 By
the end of that century, the Supreme Court in Sparf & Hansen
v. United States2 5 clearly rejected the federal jury's legal right
20. See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the
Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 903-07 (1994);
Morris S. Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into the Right to Trial by Jury in Com-
plex Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 829, 848 (1980) (noting "there is am-
ple evidence that the jury was revered in most of the American colonies, so
much so that jury trial found a regular place in Chancery"); William E. Nel-
son, The Eighteenth Century Background of John Marshall's Jurisprudence,
76 MICH. L. REV. 893, 904-17 (1978).
21. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (holding that
the Supreme Court has power to void acts of Congress "repugnant" to the
Constitution).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 28-39.
23. United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042, 1043 (D. Mass. 1835).
24. Id.
25. 156 U.S. 51 (1985).
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to nullification authority.26 That remains the definition of jury
authority to this day in the vast majority of states as well as
the federal courts: juries find facts and then (only) apply the
law as determined and dictated by the judge.
I want to suggest, in contrast with prevailing assumptions
about nullification by both its supporters and detractors, that
jury nullification can, and in many contexts does, occur within
the rule of law rather than subvert it." This thesis requires an
account of the rule of law. To that end, Part I will first trace
the competing conceptions of the rule of law and attempt to
clarify the notion by demonstrating that contemporary versions
of the idea share important features that yield a coherent ac-
count of the rule of law. Further, that account need not be re-
vised to make room for nullification; it already implies the
possibility for some forms of lawful nullification. The most im-
portant aspects of this account are diminished positivist and
formalist premises, which arise from recognition of two key de-
velopments in contemporary legal thought: the inevitably
broad range of sources that now "count" as law, and the inter-
pretive process inherent in law application. Part II will exam-
ine four different types of cases in which nullification has oc-
curred, and in which jurors are most tempted to nullify a
prosecution. Part H argues that in three of those four contexts,
nullification can be reconciled with the rule of law. The fourth,
where it cannot, tends to arise in contexts in which other offi-
cials, including judges, are no more likely than jurors to abide
by the rule of law and thus to provide a compelling alternative
26. See Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 74 (1895). The his-
tory of jury nullification and judicial responses to it (including Sparf) has been
recounted in several places, including ABRAMSON, supra note 1, at 67-88;
FYNKEL, supra note 1, at 23-33; Butler, supra note 3, at 700-05; Scott, supra
note 5, at 416-19.
27. There is a plausible argument that a system of law that includes ju-
ries with nullification power has improved odds of maintaining a just and eq-
uitable rule of law. Whether jury nullification in fact improves the rule of law
in the American criminal justice system depends on a mix of empirical data
about jury behavior and normative criteria for assessing the substantive cor-
rectness of verdicts-whether, for instance, nullification occurs most often in
cases where it is within the rule of law or in spite of it; whether judges would
give us a higher proportion of judgments within the rule of law; and how one
substantively defines the controverted notion of the rule of law itself. The last
point must account for the substantial portion of criminal law that requires
close moral judgments about, for instance, whether given circumstances con-
stitute "provocation" sufficient to reduce murder to manslaughter, or whether
a given mistake of fact was "reasonable." See FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 155-
60 (discussing the Mike Tyson rape trial).
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to the jury. In conclusion, Part III will briefly discuss how we
structure jury authority to encourage rare, and lawful, nullifi-
cation. The analysis attempts to reconcile our ambivalence
about nullification with our steadfast protection of that jury
power, as well as with our understanding of the limits of the
rule of law itself. We can then see how juries generally, and
the nullification power in particular, may well improve our
chances of acting within the rule of law rather than subverting
it.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE RULE OF LAW
The rule of law has always been a central concept of liberal
thought, serving as the means to ensure individual liberty and
control of government's coercive power.28 It stands as the al-
ternative to the "law of men" or an arbitrary sovereign who
would not be governed by rules but by whim, who would treat
like cases differently (showing favoritism to some, bias against
others) or who might change the rules after people have en-
28. See ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 12-13 (1990) (noting
the rule of law's role in preserving liberty); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 235-39 (1971) (discussing the rule of law's role in justice); id. at 239
("The connection of the rule of law with liberty is clear."); Randy E. Barnett,
Foreword: Unenumerated Constitutional Rights and the Rule of Law, 14
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 615, 615-16, 619-20 (1991) (addressing rule of law as
based on rules and principles and important to concepts of liberty and justice);
see also Judith N. Shklar, Political Theory and the Rule of Law, in THE RULE
OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY 1, 1-2 (Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick eds., 1987)
(describing one central version of the rule of law "as those institutional re-
straints that prevent governmental agents from oppressing the rest of soci-
ety"). Shklar recounts Montesquien's early vision of the rule of law, which
emphasized the need for law to restrict the arbitrary power of the governors
over the governed. Law checks the powers of kings and arbitrary legislatures,
providing a measure of security against the public sector's monopoly on the
legal use of force as well as its ability to exempt its own from the operation of
laws. Id. at 4-5.
Hayek understood the rule of law solely to provide a predictable frame-
work for public and private behavior that imposed only enough rules to limit
government power and allow private ordering-the free market-to flourish.
He summarized his very limited view of the rule of law with the assertion,
"E[sitripped of all its technicalities, this means that government in all its ac-
tions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand-rules that make it
possible to see with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive pow-
ers in given circumstances .... " FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM
54(1946).
The idea of the rule of the law precedes the Enlightenment, however, and
was an important ideal serving different purposes in classical Greek thought.
See ALTMAN, supra, at 22 (discussing Plato and Aristotle); Shklar, supra, at 1-
4 (discussing Aristotle and Montesquieu).
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gaged in a course of action which they thought complied with the
rules. 9 The rule of law, in contrast, requires that laws be gen-
eral, knowable, and performable. They must apply to all citizens
and government officials; they must be "promulgated, standing
laws" 0 available to citizens before they take action that may
violate law; and citizens must be able to conform their behavior
to the law's dictates.31 Moreover, in order to serve its central
purpose of limiting governmental action, the rule of law requires
a sustainable distinction between law (including legal reasoning
and rule application) and normative argument 3 so that rule en-
29. See BMW v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1605 (1996) (Breyer, J., concur-
ring) (contrasting "application of law" with "arbitrary coercion" and "a deci-
sionmaker's caprice"); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106,
112 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("[T]here is no more effective practical
guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that
the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be
imposed generally."); ALTMAN, supra note 28, at 10-11 (quoting L.T.
HOBHOUSE, LIBERALISM 17 (1964) as saying "free government" requires
"government not by the arbitrary determination of the ruler, but by fixed
rules of law, to which the ruler is himself subject"); RAWLS, supra note 28, at
238.
[Fireedom of men under government is to have a standing rule to live
by, common to every one of that society and made by the legislative
power erected in it, a liberty to follow my own will in all things where
the rule prescribes not, and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncer-
tain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man.
ALTMAN, supra note 28, at 10 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF
GOVERNMENT 15 (1952)); see also ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:
THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 318 (1990) (contrasting "the rule of
law" in judicial behavior with the "whims of politics and personal preference").
30. ALTMAN, supra note 28, at 10 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE
OF GOVERNMENT 77 (1952)).
31. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Politics, Interpretation,
and the Rule of Law, in NOMOS XXXVI: THE RULE OF LAW 265 (Ian Shapiro
ed., 1994) (noting that law must be prospective and publicly promulgated to be
knowable); see also LON FULLER, THE MORALiTY OF LAW 33-94 (1969) (arguing
that the "internal morality" of law requires eight characteristics in order to be
considered law, among them "conformability," "notice," and "prospectivity");
RAWLS, supra note 28, at 235 ("The conception of formal justice, the regular
and impartial administration of public rules, becomes the rule of law when
applied to the legal system."). Margaret Jane Radin "boil~s] down" Fuller's
elements of the rule of law to two notions: "first there must be rules; second,
those rules must be capable of being followed." Radin, supra note 6, at 785,
791.
These rule-of-law values regularly inform judicial opinions. See, e.g.,
BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1605 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting "uniform general
treatment of similarly situated persons" and "notice of what actions may sub-
ject them to punishment" is the "essence of law itself').
32. See ALTMAN, supra note 28, at 90 (noting the need for separation of
"legal argument and open-ended ideological" ideals).
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forcement occurs by fair, objective means rather than by the
power of those who prevail in political struggle.33
To fulfill this formidable task, the rule of law, in an earlier,
narrower conception that now seems unpersuasive, implied two
assumptions. First, it was most promising under the formalist
premises that general rules can directly decide particular cases
and can do so without reference to normative arguments or
judgments.34 Those premises underlie the requirements that
law be general, knowable, and performable, and they informed
Lon Fuller's well known description of the "'internal' morality of
law."3" If citizens know the general rule, they will be able to
follow it in a specific circumstance. Courts, or other official ac-
tors such as police, will be able to enforce law noncontrover-
sially in any given case.36 A corollary notion is that the rule of
law is likely to be more successful if the law is made of rules
rather than more flexible standards or principles. Clear rules
are easier to apply in a formalist style and thus are preferable
to standards, which call for more discretionary judgment in
their application and are likely to be less effective at limiting
official (arbitrary) action.3 7
33. For critical skepticism that rule application can be distinct from par-
ticularized narrative chosen by decision-making authorities, see KHimberle
Crenshaw & Gary Peller, Reel Time/Real Justice, 70 DEN. U. L. REV. 283
(1992).
Criminal procedure rules play a central role in this conception. The rule
of law serves to ensure elites will not arbitrarily impose deprivations of liberty
and property on ordinary citizens, and it also helps ensure that officials are
themselves held to the same criminal law standards. The independent judici-
ary, and particularly the citizen panel that is the jury, facilitate this dual
function of protecting citizens from official oppression and holding officials ac-
countable under the laws. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 28, at 235-40 (connecting
rule of law and liberty).
34. See Radin, supra note 6, at 792-96 (contrasting the forms of formalism
with the rule of law).
35. Id. at 784.
36. Id. at 792-97 (describing formal application of rule of law to specific
facts); see also ALTMAN, supra note 28, at 79 (noting examples of legal rules
insulated from normative arguments).
37. See Radin, supra note 6, at 792 (noting different versions of the rule of
law have in common important assumptions, including "law consists of
rules"); id. at 796, 809 (limiting discretion to interpret rules). See generally
RAWLS, supra note 28, at 235 ("A legal system is a coercive order of public
rules .... "); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudica-
tion, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687-701 (1976) (discussing questions of legal
form); Radin, supra note 6, at 786-87 (describing Rawls's and Fuller's concep-
tion of the rule of law as assuming that "law consists of rules"); Antonin
Scalia, The Rule of Law as the Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989)
(discussing the dichotomy of "general rule of law and a judge's personal dis-
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Second, the rule of law, in its strictest or most traditional
form, is positivist. It is the law-as identified primarily from
statutes, constitutions, case law, or other authoritative sources,
but also from observable social practices 38-that will govern of-
ficials and citizens, with little or no need to look outside those
sources in deciding cases, courses of action, or the limits of
powers and liberties. In particular, the rule of law is separate
from questions of morality; whether a given rule is law, and
whether it applies in a given case, does not depend on ques-
tions of its morality generally or of the morality of the case out-
come. Thus one need not refer to such sources outside the law
to decide cases.
39
We see from this brief overview how jury nullification, al-
most by definition, can seem a grave threat to the rule of law.
Nullification entails the rule of individuals (jurors) arbitrarily
deciding to resolve a case according to their own political and
moral beliefs rather than applying the general rule that has
governed other, comparable cases. By definition it suggests
that a general rule was not applied to a case it clearly gov-
erned.
cretion); Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POLY 645 (1991) (discussing the connection between law and rules).
38. See H.L.A HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 113 (1961) (stating "common
standards of official behaviour" that officials have "appraise[d] critically" are a
source of rules).
39. See Jules Coleman, Rules and Social Facts, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POLY 703, 715-17 (1991) (describing positivist core claim that "morality of a
legal norm is analytically distinct from its legality"). Hart's famous discussion
of the positivist thesis is found in Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958). My summary here of course short-
changes a sophisticated debate among positivists (and their critics) as to the
proper understanding of positivism. But in addition to the thesis that law is
separate from morals, it is fair to say a central tenet of positivism is the claim
that law can be identified objectively, or as a matter of social fact or historical
practice. Leading statements of positivism include HANS KELSEN, GENERAL
THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (1961) and JOSEPH RAZ, THE AuTHORrry OF LAW
(1979). For a brief description of positivism and an argument that positivism
may nevertheless require moral evaluation of law, see DAVID LYONS, ETHICS
AND THE RULE OF LAW 63-68 (1984).
Rawls's more recent reconception of the rule of law posits it as a prereq-
uisite for natural justice and individual liberty, and thus blurs the distinction
between law and morality. He still conceives of law, however, as needing to
be "clearly defined," and the judicial process that applies them "impartial" and
characterized by "essential integrity" that treats similar cases similarly, so
that the "boundaries of our liberty are [not] uncertain" and rules provide a
clear basis for legitimate expectations as to legal behavior. RAWLS, supra note
28, at 238-40.
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Interestingly, the long-standing notion of how juries apply
law follows the same formalist and positivist precepts of the
traditional version of the rule of law. A series of nineteenth
century cases (from an era more formalist than our own) with-
drew from juries the power to determine and interpret law as
well as facts. In its place, it constructed a framework in which
juries are to determine facts, "take" the law as judges give it to
them, and "apply" it to those facts.40  This is the essence of
Justice Story's construction of the jury's role; it hinges on the
formalist belief that there is very little left to do once the gen-
eral rule is stated by the judge and the facts are found by the
jury. The same assumption supported the Supreme Court's
decision in Sparf & Hansen v. United States4' at the end of the
nineteenth century. Sparf & Hansen acknowledged the jury's
power to nullify but denied it had a "moral right" to do so,
warning that "[ilf the jury were at liberty to settle the law for
themselves,... the law itself would be most uncertain."42 Un-
certainty undermines the rule of law. To preserve certainty
and remove the jury from the task of law interpretation, appli-
cation of law must be a nonproblematic, even mechanical
task.43
Formalism sustained a mortal blow beginning early in this
century with the critique of legal realism.' Formalism's
"mechanical jurisprudence," realists argued, either risked
yielding unjust results by paying insufficient attention to sub-
stantive justice in a particular case, or was sufficiently inde-
terminate that general rules did not in fact constrain judges'
decisions or eliminate political judgments. Hart defended a
weaker form of positivist formalism that conceded there are
cases in the "penumbra" of a rule where law is "incurably in-
40. The scare quotes indicate terms since made problematic, as explained
infra in text accompanying notes 44-48 (discussing the realistic attack on for-
malist rules).
41. 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
42. Id. at 74.
43. See Radin, supra note 6, at 795 ("In the traditional conception of the
nature of rules, a rule is self-applying to the set of particulars said to fall un-
der it; its application is thought to be analytic.").
44. That the blow was "mortal" is not, of course, a universally agreed
upon assessment. Formalism continues to have its defenders. See Frederick
Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988) (redescribing formalism and of-
fering some defense of decisionmaking constrained by rules, and thereby of
formalism); Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rational-
ity of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 1012-16 (1988) (describing the ways formalism
allows elaboration of law as justification).
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complete" and rule application uncertain. His solution was
that "aims, purposes and policies" identified within the law,
rather than "moral principles" outside of law, guided judges in
these cases where correct application of law was admittedly
uncertain.45  The positivist claim has met considerable chal-
lenge,46 and though it retains prominent adherents,4 7 articulat-
ing the rule of law in positivist terms is considerably less per-
suasive to many contemporary lawyers and scholars. For rule
application in particular cases, a weakening of positivism
makes room for broader, moral arguments in the project of rule
interpretation.48
Despite the realist critique, scholars and courts continue to
have faith in the possibility of the rule of law and have recon-
structed the notion in a variety of ways mostly free of its for-
malist and positivist premises. 49 Dominant understandings of
45. See Hart, supra note 39, at 614 (discussing the application of law in
light of its purpose); see also id. at 627 (including an unforeseen case under a
rule done by "natural elaboration" of the rule's "purpose").
46. See, e.g., LYONS, supra note 39, at 63-68 (arguing that a positivist
"social theory of law" may still entail, in its criteria for identifying law, an
evaluation of a law's morality); Gustav Radbruch, Five Minutes of Legal Phi-
losophy, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 109 (Joel Feinburg & Hyman Gross eds.,
1986) (criticizing the positivist theories of law).
47. See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 39, at 37-52 (explaining legal positivism and
its relation to sources of the law); Coleman, supra note 39, at 709-14
(supporting Schauer and the positivist tradition); Schauer, supra note 37, at
665-79 (discussing and supporting various positivist theories).
48. Har's contemporary critic, Lon Fuller, working from natural law
premises, counters that Hare's positivism provides no help to those facing dif-
ficult legal decisions, since resolving hard cases requires viewing the "duty of
fidelity to law in a context which also embraces [the] responsibility for making
law what it ought to be." Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply
to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 647 (1958).
As noted above, Hart's form of positivism allows broad consideration of
social aims, policies, and purposes to interpret rules. Whether one agrees
with him that those considerations nevertheless are found solely in legal
rather than moral or political sources, and whether one will broaden the
range of such sources for interpretation to include a society's general political
and moral commitments as Dworkin argues, see infra notes 54-62 and accom-
panying text, the project of rejecting non-literal applications of law to particu-
lar cases (which when done by juries is labeled nullification) already seems a
more plausible course within rule-of-law terms.
49. More recent defenses and descriptions of the rule of law include
ALTMAN, supra note 28, at 22-103 (describing rule of law as a way to protect
individual liberty and prevent government coercion); NOMOS XXXVI: THE RULE
OF LAW 1-10 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994) (connecting rule of law to democracy, jus-
tice and rationality); RAWLS, supra note 28, at 239-40 (connecting the rule of
law with basic notions of liberty); Radin, supra note 6, at 809 (explaining that
rule of law forces decisionmakers to be bound by the rules of society as op-
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the rule of law are now largely integrated into contemporary
understandings of law's inextricable interaction with its larger
social context,50 the inevitable over- and underinclusiveness of
general rules,51 and the unavoidable interpretive task in rule
application. 2 It is the contemporary reconception of the rule of
law, built on insights from realism and pragmatism, that opens
the way for understanding jury nullification within the rule of
law.5 3
One prominent example comes from Ronald Dworkin, a
key critic of Hart's positivism, who reconstructs the rule of law
so as to broaden the sources to which legal decisionmakers
posed to the rules of individuals); Barnett, supra note 28, at 640 (concluding
that rule of law is the means through which society protects unenumerated
constitutional rights).
50. See, e.g., Radin, supra note 6, at 809 (explaining that rule of law
forces decisiomnakers to be bound by the rules of society as opposed to rules
of individuals); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953,
955 (1995) (discussing the difficulty in focusing solely on rules while ignoring
all other factors in the decision-making process); see also HART, infra note 53,
at 8 (arguing that "other resources than words" help give "content or mean-
ing" to rules in particular cases).
51. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 37, at 1687-701 (arguing that clear
rules result in less statutory vagueness and overbreadth); Radin, supra note
6, at 785-87 (positing that for rule of law to work, rules must exist that people
can follow); Sunstein, supra note 50, at 955 (discussing how focusing on rules
alone does not result in consistent decisionmaking).
52. See, e.g., BMW v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1605 (1996) (Breyer, J., con-
curring) (noting that "legal standards need not be precise" to constrain deci-
sion-maker discretion and provide fairness and general treatment of similar
cases by the application of law); Barnett, supra note 28; Cass R. Sunstein, On
Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 767-90 (1993) (suggesting al-
ternative approaches to employ when interpreting and applying rules).
This is not to say that positivism does not still have its adherents, or that
such adherents do not recognize law's inextricable link to society. See Cole-
man, supra note 39, at 717-18.
53. Even Hart's version of positivism concedes the considerable need in
the process of legal decisionmaking for something more than seemingly lit-
eral, formalist rule application. For one, Hart always recognized that, given
his conception of law as social fact and of the indeterminate nature of general
rules, there are instances in which law is uncertain-cases for which there is
no clear rule on point. These are not cases that present the most perplexing
issues of nullification. Hart conceded, however, that even relatively clear
general rules can be indeterminate, in the sense that it is not clear from the
language alone how a given case should be decided. "A legal system often has
other resources besides the words used in the formulation of its rules which
serve to determine their content or meaning in particular cases." H.L.A.
HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 8 (1983). Thus, a judge-
or jury-often must look to sources outside the written rule to determine its
application. Yet in its search of social practices or traditions to arrive at an
application that may not be the formalist-literalist one, it is still acting within
the rule of law, because there is no other way for law to operate.
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(including citizens) should turn in understanding and applying
law. 4 Dworkin attempts to disprove Hart's conclusion that law
leaves gaps of uncertainty at the same time that he denies
Hart's thesis on the separability of law from morality 5 and in-
sists on reference to moral norms in legal decisions. Dworkin
reconceives law as including not only rules but also general
principles, by which he means more than Hart's "social aims,
purposes and policies."56  Dworkin contends that using this
broader range of sources and more comprehensive approach to
deciding cases, eliminates the legal uncertainty as well as the
injustice dilemma realists identify in literalist rule applica-
tion 7 In Dworkin's view, general principles provide a stable
source of guidance to decide both individual cases for which no
rule is directly on point, and cases in which seemingly literal
rule application would yield a result widely considered unjust.
If people accept that they are governed not only by explicit rules laid
down in past political decisions but by whatever other standards flow
from the principles these decisions assume, then the set of recognized
public standards can expand and contract organically, as people be-
come more sophisticated in sensing and exploring what these princi-
ples require in new circumstances, without the need for detailed leg-
islation or adjudication on each possible point of conflict.58
Citizens, then, must discern and act upon the moral prin-
ciples implicit in prior decisions in addition to explicit rules
from courts and legislatures. "Rights and responsibilities flow
from past decisions and so count as legal not just when they
are explicit in these decisions but also when they follow from
the principles of personal and political morality the explicit
decisions presuppose by way of justification."59 If we assume
that laws are justified and made coherent only by the assump-
tion of underlying principle, we can "treat... internally com-
promised statutes... as unprincipled, and we then have a rea-
54. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAWS EMPIRE (1986).
55. This awkward phrase frequently appears in positivist literature. See
Coleman, supra note 39, at 715-16 (noting that "[plositivists and their critics
refer to this core claim of positivism [that the morality of a legal norm is ana-
lytically distinct from its legality] as the separability thesis").
56. HART, supra note 53, at 8; ef. Sunstein, supra note 50, at 996-97
(discussing the multiple roles of "principles" in law).
57. See DWORKIN, supra note 54, at 266-71; Ronald Dworkin, The Model
of Rules, 35 U. CI. L. REV. 14, 29 (1967); see also Barnett, supra note 28, at
616-20 (discussing Dworkin's use of principles to reconceive the rule of law
and respond to the injustice and uncertainty criticisms).
58. DWORKIN, supra note 54, at 188 (suggesting that the rule of law re-
sults in fairer outcomes than literal rule application).
59. Id. at 96.
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son for arguing that no official should contribute to his state's
unprincipled acts."60 Dworkin's approach to law as "integrity"
requires that "each citizen must accept demands on him, and
may make demands on others, that share and extend the moral
dimension of any explicit political decisions. Integrity there-
fore fuses citizens' moral and political lives: it asks the good
citizen.., to interpret the common scheme of justice ..... 61
Two important points emerge from Dworkin's argument.
The first is his redescription of the rule of law in a form that
explicitly calls for consideration of sources, including norma-
tive considerations, outside the immediate written rule to be
applied. 2 Second is his conclusion that the rule of law not only
permits interpretation of rules through such sources in a man-
ner that may yield results very different from literal rule appli-
cation, but may require it. Dworkin's central proposition, that
the rule of law requires something more than literal or
"mechanical" application of black-letter law and may require
reference to accepted visions of political morality or the social
good, is widely shared among a range of scholars who continue
to believe the rule of law is a functional ideal, even when they
differ from Dworkin in significant respects.6 3
Randy Barnett, for one, shares this premise in his argu-
ment that unenumerated constitutional rights are consistent
with the rule of law.' Although such rights pose the obvious
problem that their unspecified content conflicts with the re-
quirement that law be understandable in advance of action,6 5
Barnett argues that "[t]he rule of law is not a commitment to
60. Id. at 187.
61. Id. at 189-90.
62. This refers even to sources outside the social practices and interpre-
tive practices that give written rules their substantive content. See id. at 187-
90.
63. Cass Sunstein and Judith Shklar share this commitment. See, e.g.,
Shklar, supra note 28, at 6, 12 (concluding that implicit in the rule of law is a
rule of rationality or reason for judicial decisionmaking that must be ani-
mated by "some sort of political and philosophical setting" and positing that a
defensible conception of the "rationality of judging" requires an "ethical and
political setting"); Sunstein, supra note 50, at 959-68 (discussing "sources of
law" that include discretion, factors, standards, principles, and guidelines in
addition to rules and arguing for a mix of "casuistry" with rule application);
id. at 978-96 (discussing problems with rules and the need for other sources of
law and means of interpretation).
64. Barnett, supra note 28, at 620 (citing the Ninth Amendment and the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as unenu-
merated rights).
65. See id. at 621.
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rules simpliciter .... It is a commitment to a particular set of
values-in particular, the value of enabling persons to discern
the requirements of justice in advance of action." This rule-of-
law requirement "can be satisfied by means other than general
rules-for instance, by general principles."66 Barnett posits a
"presumption of liberty," based on the Framers' supposition of
natural rights that precedes governmental grant of rights. The
presumption would require that legislative enactment's be jus-
tified by demonstrating they do not infringe "the rightful exer-
cise of liberty by a person."67 Placing the burden on govern-
ment (rather than on the citizen) to demonstrate a statute's
unconstitutionality affects a key rule-of-law function: detection
of enforcement abuse.68 Barnett, then, shares the contempo-
rary rule-of-law assumption that law is more than rules, and
includes broad principles such as his presumption of liberty.
Moreover, though he does not develop the point, the project of
identifying "rightful exercise of liberty" will be a difficult one
that demands integrating conclusions about traditions, norms
and social conventions, further complicating rule-of-law deci-
sionmaking.69
Margaret Jane Radin has offered perhaps the broadest de-
scription of law's inevitably open texture and normative com-
ponents that still attempts to articulate a rule of law ideal.70
66. Id. at 624.
67. Id. at 640.
68. See id. at 641. Barnett adds: "After all, legislatures are but men and
women, and if the 'rule of men' is to be avoided, then legislative enactments
must be scrutinized to determine whether they are truly laws.'" Id.
Enforcement abuse---"guard[ing] against official departures from the
rules of law"-is also "the jury's fundamental function." MORTIMER R. KADIsH
& SANFORD H. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY 53 (1973).
69. Barnett builds his thesis in part upon Frederick Schauer's accounts of
the rule of law as "presumptive positivism" that concedes law must at some
point build upon normative or substantive premises. See, e.g., FREDERICK
SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-
BASED DECIsIONMAKING IN LAw AND LIFE (1991); Schauer, supra note 37.
70. Radin, supra note 6, at 810-19 (suggesting various modifications and
reinterpretations of the rule of law).
I would argue that Dworkin's premise-though not the claim of a deter-
minate result he says it achieves-is in important respects shared by critical
legal scholars skeptical of the rule of law. If Dworkin's point is that one can-
not separate rule interpretation and case decisionmaking from moral and po-
litical judgments, that assertion is shared by such critical scholars as Cren-
shaw and Peller. See generally Crenshaw & Peller, supra note 33 (arguing
that rule application can be distinct from a particularized narrative chosen by
decision-making authorities). A key difference in the two positions-besides
Dworkin's claim of a determinate, right answer and critical legal scholar's
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Employing a Wittgensteinian view of rules as knowable only
from social practice, Radin describes rules as "contingent not
just upon the acts of legislatures ... but also upon the sur-
rounding social context, the content of an entire form of life.""'
They exist "by virtue of their being embedded in our nomos," so
that decisions according to rules respond not just to legislative
commands but "necessarily to the community as a whole." 2 To
sustain a conception of the rule of law after abandoning formal-
ism and accepting that rules are available only through social
practice (or, to capture much of the same point, through tradi-
tion, custom, and precedent), Radin reinterprets the rule of law
"as a pragmatic, normative activity." 3 This idea entails dimin-
ishing distinctions between preexisting rules and their appli-
cation, or between rulemaking and rule application.74 A rule,
and especially a rule's relevance to a given case, "will be public
whenever strong social agreement exists in practice."7 15 Fur-
thermore, judges and juries who apply the rules inevitably help
make rules by interpreting them in new, specific contexts,
thereby defining their content. Yet "law does not disappear,"
and "[1]ife according to rules is not impossible, but quite rou-
tine." 7 For Radin, more than other contemporary rule of law
scholars, law does not simply include sources beyond written
rules; its most important sources lie there.7 8
One can find a somewhat less radical description of non-
rule-based normativism within the rule of law in William
Eskridge's process theory-inspired approach to legal interpre-
tation. He finds the source of law's "coherence and justice" in
"interpretive regimes, which are systems of norms or conven-
tions that regulate the interpretation of legal materials" 79 for
both courts and citizens.
denial of one-may be that Dworkin posits political-moral sources as more
widely shared commitments available to all who strive to interpret law with
integrity, while crits emphasize the multiple, often conflicting social perspec-
tives that inevitably inform the substantive construction of rules.
71. Radin, supra note 6, at 808.
72. Id. at 808-09.
73. Id.
74. See id. at 810-14.
75. Id. at 817.
76. See id.
77. Id. at 819.
78. Radin identifies her differences with Dworkin, and argues for inter-
preting some of his work as sharing her key points. See id. at 804-06, 809 &
n.96, 813 & n.115.
79. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 31, at 265, 267 (emphasis omitted).
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[These regimes] are not arbitrary collections of norms but typically
rest on conceptions of public life and the political process-that is, on
political theories-and... provide[] some degree of insulation against
political forces surrounding courts, and can work to increase lawlike-
ness.
80
Using these norms and conventions, Eskridge suggests it
is up to courts to find "coherence ... and lawlikeness" in stat-
utes, "even when.., statutes themselves fail to possess these
properties."1 Though this approach has significant differences
with Dworkins, 2 it shares with Dworkin the view that law
application calls for reconciling statutory language with norms,
social practices, and public commitments in ways that may
yield case dispositions different from those produced by seem-
ingly literal statutory interpretation. Such interpretation may
thereby make an application more consistent with the overall
rule of law, i.e., more "lawlike," than a prosecutor's choice of
literal statutory application. 3 When adapting this description
to jury decisions, we will see that the jury's nullification ver-
dict-against, say, Fugitive Slave law or Prohibition law prose-
cutions, or even biased criminal justice administration-may
give (to borrow Dworkin's terms) coherence or integrity that
would not result from some combination of literal statutory in-
terpretation, inappropriate prosecution policy choices, and bi-
ased police work.
80. Id. at 267.
8L Id. at 269.
82. See id. at 278-80 (criticizing Dworkin's "strong normativism" approach
and distinguishing it from the authors' "weak normativism).
83. Some rule of law theories build on recognition of the imperfections of
legislatures. In recent decades, political science and legal scholarship, as well
as some judicial opinion, has developed a skeptical view of legislative behavior
and capacity. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES
46-60 (2d ed. 1963) (explaining what is now called "Arrow's Theorem," demon-
strating that collective bodies may not be able to choose among multiple policy
options in a manner that coherently reflects popular will); JAMES M. Bu-
CHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 283-95 (1962)
(examining special interest influence in political decision-making); DANIEL A.
FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL IN-
TRODUCTION 38-62 (1991) (discussing Arrow's theorem); DENNIS C. MUELLER,
PUBLIC CHOICE (1979) (criticizing political decisionmaking using economic
theory); MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965) (examining the dynamics of lobby-
ing groups); Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 31, at 271-73 (discussing the
"new textualism" theory of statutory interpretation). A key implication drawn
from these conclusions by some rule of law theorists is that seemingly literal
statute application may not yield a coherent rule of law. On this view, the
rule of law requires creative, normative interpretation of statutes that rec-
onciles legislatively produced rules with other sources of law.
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In contrast to theorists who reconceive the rule of law in
pragmatist or interpretive terms, one can juxtapose more tra-
ditional or formalist rule-of-law adherents, who view the "rule
of law as a law of rules."84 Justice Scalia is probably the most
prominent advocate of conceiving the rule of law as a set of
clear rules. While Scalia does not identify his rule-of-law de-
scription in comparable interpretive terms, it is worth noting
that even he makes some concession to the need for sources
outside of written text and for strategies beyond literalism to
apply rules. Scalia repeatedly refers to general principles that
are necessary even for his textualist approach to rule applica-
tion. He also concedes the imperfect fit of ex ante rules to all
cases and the need for courts to be "unconstrained by such im-
perfect generalizations.""5 Similarly, in his dissenting opinion
in Chisom v. Roemer,86 Scalia argues that the Court should
"first, find the ordinary meaning of the language in its textual
context; and second, using established canons of construction,
ask whether there is any clear indication that some permissi-
ble meaning other than the ordinary one applies." Ordinary
meaning should prevail "especially if a good reason for the or-
dinary meaning appears plain."87 Thus even his formalist ap-
proach concedes the need to consider textual context, employ
interpretive strategies or canons, search for "indications" that
may trump plain meaning, and to bolster a plain-meaning
reading with "good reason[s]."
One cannot fairly read Scalia to align himself with
Dworkin, Radin, or Eskridge, but the concession of the need for
principles and discretion beyond written rules raises the pros-
pect that a jury may need to turn to such principles in-its law
application task. Moreover, Scalia's concession leaves him
vulnerable to the critique of formalism and positivism upon
which these other scholars have reconceived the rule of law.88
84. See Scalia, supra note 37, at 1175.
85. Id. at 1177.
86. 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, dissenting).
87. Id.
88. See Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes,
Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533, 544-49 (1991)
(criticizing premises and methods of formalism offered by scholars and judges,
including Scalia, and arguing that "practical reason" and "situation sense" is
unavoidable when judges interpret statutes).
One might also point out that Scalia's own example of his "textualist" ap-
proach in Michigan v. Chesternut, in which he gave content to the Fourth
Amendment term "seizure" by requiring the facts to reveal "a restraining ef-
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That is, if one concedes that rules are not always neutrally self-
executing and that one must look to sources other than rules'
terms to give them content and correct their imperfections,
then (at least to those critical of formalism) one has already
started down the road of contextualized application shared by
Radin's pragmatism, Eskridge's dynamic interpretation, and
Dworkin's integration of rules with moral principle.
With the exception, then, of ostensibly rule-based ap-
proaches such as Scalia's, the contemporary reconception of the
rule of law accepts that law application is inevitably a broadly
interpretive task. It is important for our purposes to keep in
mind Dworkin's conclusion that ordinary citizens, in addition
to highly trained judges, can (indeed, must) engage in this
task. Citizens' capability to handle that task, after all, is a
premise of the rule of law: citizens must be able to understand
what the law requires in order to structure their private behav-
ior in accordance with it. Ordinary citizens acting as jurors
can and must do so as well.
This contemporary understanding of the rule of law opens
the door for understanding how jury nullification can occur
within the rule of law; we might now describe such a verdict as
principled, or lawful, nullification. Juries, like judges, and like
citizens making decisions on everyday courses of action, con-
front cases in which seemingly literal or clear rule applications
are not appropriate because in the context of the case they
conflict with other compelling norms, principles, or values.
Rule application (even applications that Hart might consider
clear cases in the "core" of a rule)89 must still be reconciled with
a widely shared commitment to a "more fundamental public
conception of justice," and with "standards [that] flow from the
principles" implied in existing statutes, case law, and even so-
fect," as an approach that is a better example of contextualized purposive in-
terpretation than a literal, textualist one. See 486 U.S. 567, 576-77 (1988);
Scalia, supra note 37, at 1184. After all, devoid of all reference to its purpose,
the word "seizure" might refer to an epileptic fit as much as a police arrest.
Thus, his approach seems at least as interpretive as Harts integration of
law's "aims and policies," or Henry Hart and Albert Sacks's legal process ap-
proach to purposive statutory interpretation. One could take the critique.
considerably farther to deny the possibility of giving content to text without
inclusion of social, political or normative assumptions. See generally Gary
Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151 (1985)
(arguing that legal reasoning is political and ideological in that it institu-
tionalizes certain metaphors for the representation of social life).
89. See Hart, supra note 39, at 607 ([T]he general words we use... must
have some standard instance in which no doubts are felt about its application.
There must be a core of settled meaning....").
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cial practice.90 In Rawls's conception, we check our general
rule commitments against more intuitive "considered judg-
ments" about particular case outcomes, in an effort to assess
whether general rules yield the same results as those judg-
ments. When they do not, we consider which needs adjust-
ment, the rule or the sense of justice about a particular case,
and seek a "reflective equilibrium" between them.91
Courts, of course, acknowledge law's basis in norms and
social practice and at times explicitly develop law upon the
basis of community sentiments or practices. One example
relevant to criminal law is Eighth Amendment doctrine defin-
ing disproportionate and excessive punishment, which relies on
indicia of community standards, including jury verdicts.92
Courts have also, at least at times, conceded if not endorsed a
view of the jury's task of applying law which accepts that juries
interpret the law given to them with reference to principles
and norms outside the literal language of the relevant stat-
ute.93 Moreover, juries must do so not merely to the minimal
extent necessary to confront ambiguous statutory language,
but also with an eye toward serving public purposes assigned
to the jury to fulfill. That would explain the Court's position in
Duncan v. Louisiana94 that one function of the jury is to guard
against official departures from the rules, but an equally im-
portant function is, on proper occasions, to depart from unjust
rules or their unjust application.95 The Court thus implies that
one function of the jury is to enter nullification verdicts. To
identify such instances of injustice within the rule of law, a
jury must check the application of the criminal law that the
prosecutor seeks against a substantive vision of justice in its
current social context.96 Additionally, the Court has repeatedly
90. DWORKIN, supra note 54, at 187.
91. RAWLS, supra note 28, at 19-21, 46-51. Rawls actually uses the term
"principles," for which I substitute "general rules" here so as not to confuse his
use of "principle" with the present discussion of principles that mediate rules.
92. See David C. Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences:
An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
661, 665 (1983).
93. See, e.g., United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 182 (3d Cir. 1969)
(i[Tlhe jury, as conscience of the community, must be permitted to look at
more than logic.").
94. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
95. Id. at 156-57. But see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695
(1984) (implying jury nullification is an arbitrary and "lawless decision").
96. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 52, at 750-51 (stating that "[liegal problems
are ... evaluated by comparing apparently plausible general theories with
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described the criminal jury as an important check on biased
prosecutors and judges.97
H. FOUR EXAMPLES OF NULLIFICATION
One fact often overlooked in discussions of nullification is
that such verdicts, far from always demonstrating inexplicable
caprice or unprincipled favoritism to a defendant, occur in very
different sorts of cases for very different reasons.98 It is likely
that almost everyone would find historical examples of pre-
sumptive nullification whose substantive outcome they agree
with, even if they disagree with the means for achieving it. 99
The occasions likely to provoke nullification may be divided, for
present purposes, into roughly four types, all with historical
and contemporary antecedents. In three, I suggest nullifica-
tion is consistent with, and perhaps necessary for, the rule of
law. Only in the final scenario does nullification occur as a
product of unjustified bias, the form that some (including the
great weight of the case law) seem to view as the only cause of
nullification. While verdicts in this last category are to be con-
demned, the more important point is that they historically
have occurred in contexts in which other legal decisionmakers
are unlikely to demonstrate much less bias than the jury. That
is, they occur on occasions in which the rule of law is not func-
tioning. Thus, rather than providing grounds for condemning
the jury and its nullification power generally, this last set of
verdicts simply reminds us of the precariousness of the rule of
law, and of law's dependence on a social-political culture and
civic practice to fulfill its promise of providing justice and fair-
ness.
apparently plausible outcomes in particular cases" and that, by comparing
general theories with "considered judgments about particular disputes," we
may end up adjusting either the general rule or the individual case judgment).
97. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (stating that
juries protect against the "overzealous or mistaken prosecutor" and the
"overconditioned or biased response of a judge"); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406
U.S. 356, 373 (1972) (stating that juries "'safeguard against arbitrary law en-
forcement'") (quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 87 (1970)). This func-
tion becomes important below when I consider Butler's proposal for nullification
in response to a biased criminal justice system. See Butler, supra note 3; see
also infra Part 1.C (discussing Butler's thesis).
98. But see ABRAMSON, supra note 1, at 61-67 (discussing the "two sides
of nullification); FINKEL, supra note 1, at 32-33 (observing that "[t]he generic
term 'nullification! masks important distinctions among types of nullifica-
tion").
99. See GREENAWALT, supra note 3, at 362 (noting the historical legiti-
macy of jury nullification).
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A. NULLIFICATION AS A RESPONSE TO UNCORRECTED RULE
VIOLATIONS
First, consider what may be the most difficult scenario to
justify nullification: a case in which a just law is justly applied
to the defendant, but in the process of which public officials
violate important laws. To animate the point, imagine a hypo-
thetical case that resembles a recent real-life verdict most
Americans know all too much about: the 1995 acquittal of O.J.
Simpson on murder charges. To avoid the disputes about the
actual facts of that case, let us say the evidence of guilt about
our hypothetical defendant is clear beyond all reasonable
doubt. However, it is also clear to the jury that the prosecu-
tion, through its police witnesses, has offered illegal evidence.
Let us say that one police witness was shown by other evidence
to have lied under oath, thereby committing perjury as well as
impeaching his credibility. It is also clear that the police offi-
cers violated constitutional rules regulating searches and sei-
zures, and thereby offered illegally obtained evidence as well
as perjured themselves to justify that illegal seizure.I 0
100. For a comparable case, see People v. Wright, where the trial court
found that the "defense counsel was inviting the jury, directly or indirectly, to
acquit defendant on the ground that the seizure of the gun was illegal." 645
N.Y.S.2d 275, 276 (Sup. Ct. 1996). The judge, who had found the seizure law-
ful in a pre-trial hearing, instructed the jury that "whether the approach and
stop of defendant was lawful is not for you to decide." Id.
One problem here is that a jury would likely have little information about
a Fourth Amendment violation because that issue would have been litigated
outside its presence and decided by a judge. Unless jurors happen to know
some constitutional criminal procedure-possible, but probably not a wide-
spread occurrence-they may have only partial information about a search
and the basis for it.
But take a scenario in which officers, upon discovering a murder victim's
body, immediately go to the home of the victim's ex-spouse, climb the fence,
and find incriminating evidence on the grounds. They testify, both in the
suppression hearing and at trial, that they entered the ex-spouse's property
without a warrant not to search for evidence or because the ex-spouse was a
suspect, but simply to notify him of the victim's demise and to check on his
own safety. A state court judge is likely to accept that explanation to avoid
excluding pertinent evidence. Nevertheless, a reasonable person might
strongly suspect that the officers perjured themselves to conceal their real
motives and knowledge.
At trial, a jury would likely hear this same explanation for initially
climbing the fence and entering the grounds. More readily than a judge in the
context of a suppression hearing, the jury might openly recognize the expla-
nation as a lie. Thus, the jurors know at least of the crime of perjury, and
may be able to infer that there is something suspicious about or wrong with
the evidence. If they do not know that it was improperly seized in violation of
1172 [Vol. 81:1149
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The rule of law, in this scenario, has been breached long
before the jury's verdict: multiple instances of perjury as well
as the unconstitutional search violate the rule of law. Fur-
thermore, save for the jury, all mechanisms have failed to cor-
rect that breach and punish its perpetrators. The state's
prosecutors have offered the perjured testimony and illegally
seized evidence in court, when they had the discretion and
duty not to do so.1"1 If, as is likely, they knew of its illegal na-
ture before court, they could have prevented its use at trial. If
they did not learn of the perjury until after it was offered, they
could have sought to strike the evidence from the record. In-
deed, if the prosecutors knew of it before offering it, they
committed the additional crime of suborning perjury. Further,
if a judge had decided in a pre-trial hearing not to enforce the
exclusionary rule against the illegally obtained evidence, that
would constitute an additional breach of the rule of law.102
the Fourth Amendment, they may at least be suspicious about why witnessescriminally lied about the circumstances that led them to the evidence.
10L See Scott Turow, Simpson Prosecutors Pay for Their Blunders, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 4, 1995, at A21 (former federal prosecutor criticizing prosecutors
for defending police officers' "arrogant blunders" and "dubious claims]" in
court, and arguing that when prosecutors reject police illegality, police at-
tempt such actions less often). Furthermore, prosecutors have the obligation
to achieve justice rather than mere victory. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: THE PROSECUTOR FUNCTION STANDARD 3-1.2 (1993) (stating thatjustice, not merely conviction, is a goal of the prosecutorial function).
102. Many may find this possibility implausible. Other than reversal on
appeal, which is the primary means our system provides to correct a trialjudge's error, it is hard even to know definitively whether a judge got the law
wrong on an issue such as the legality of search. I suggest, however, that one
needs to turn to the accounts of trial lawyers and of low-level court systems,
particularly in local or state courts, where the "facts on the ground" are often
at odds with what formal rules seem to mandate. Such accounts reveal, for
instance, that some judges grant or deny suppression motions much more
readily than others, and those discrepancies are not eliminated on appeal.
See, e.g., Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as
Text: Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1298,
1320-21 (1992) (reprinting the transcript of a trial judge's denial of a sup-
pression motion based on Terry v. Ohio, and discussing the judge's blatant re-
fusal to follow clearly applicable law). Also, the de facto customs of local
practice may discourage attorneys from appealing or even filing motions, un-
der penalty of paying some cost from judges such as fewer court appointed
cases, or harsher penalties for clients on whose behalf those motions were
filed. See, e.g., EDWARD HUMEs, No MATTER How LOUD I SHOUT 252 (1996)(describing just such a "time-honored tradition" in the Los Angeles juvenile
court system). As one example of the price an attorney-or client-can pay, in
a case from my own experience as a public defender, I feel certain that a judge
sentenced one of my clients much more harshly after I successfully made a
motion for funds from the court, then lost the final verdict.
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Nullification here is consistent with the rule of law; it
might even be necessary for it."°3 Under contemporary under-
standings of the rule of law, a jury may-or must-reconcile
literal application of the criminal statute with principles and
norms implicated in the case. Nullification here could be an
act upholding the rule of law by condemning the prior, official
breach of the rule of law. The jury, drawing from popular sen-
timents shaped in part by constitutional law, may determine
official lawlessness to be the graver violation, perhaps on the
reasoning that the rule of law serves foremost to set parame-
ters of official behavior vis-a-vis spheres of individual liberty
that were violated here. When faced with a choice between
leaving unpunished an official violation (perjury, subornation,
unconstitutional searches) and one by a private citizen (murder),
the rule of law may give primary concern to official lawlessness,
even given the gravity of the privately caused harm.
1°4
For a general account of egregious misconduct by federal prosecutors, see
Jim McGee, Prosecutor Oversight Is Often Hidden from Sight, WASH. POST,
Jan. 15, 1993, at Al; Jim McGee, Between Politics and Professionalism: One
Prosecutor's Tenure and Tactics, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 1993, at Al; Jim
McGee, Courts Losing Options in Prosecutor Misdeeds, WASH. POST, Jan. 13,
1993, at Al; Jim McGee, Grand Jury Shielded From the Facts: A Defendant's
Nightmare, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1993, at Al; Jim McGee, U.S. Crusade
Against Pornography Tests the Limits of Fairness, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 1993,
at Al; Jim McGee, War on Crime Expands U.S. Prosecutors' Powers: Aggres-
sive Tactics Put Fairness at Issue, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 1993, at Al.
103. I am assuming here that the jury, having found some of the evidence
to be perjured and thus not credible, discarded that evidence and yet still
found the facts to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the necessary elements.
(A not-guilty verdict would not be nullification here if, excluding perjurious
testimony, the remaining evidence then did not overcome reasonable doubts.)
Yet still contributing to the state's case is illegally seized evidence and perjury
to support its admission.
104. This argument does not depend on jurors actually having a working
knowledge of rule of law precepts and actually engaging in this sort of in-
formed, thorough reasoning. More likely, jurors who reach this conclusion
would do so by some combination of what we could call instinct, commonsense,
and strong negative reaction to official misconduct, which may carry more
weight in their minds if it resonates with a general knowledge of official mis-
conduct that jurors assess as a serious societal problem. Cf. Albert J. Moore,
Trial By Schema: Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom, 37 UCLA L. REV. 273,
293-303 (1989) (demonstrating with cognitive science theory that jurors re-
member and give more weight and credibility to evidence that fits a "cognitive
schema" previously formed by personal experience or knowledge). The argu-
ment is directly analogous to Dworkin's thesis that his "law as integrity" rea-
soning process engaged in by Judge Hercules is descriptively accurate of real
judges' reasoning practice. Though he concedes most judges do not con-
sciously engage in the comprehensive synthesis of law, political theory, and
morality that his theory requires, the thesis retains its descriptive power
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That seemingly drastic choice-to punish an illegal search
before murder or some other crime-is one already well estab-
lished in existing law. In this hypothetical case, nullification
works exactly like the exclusionary rule devised to enforce the
Fourth Amendment: it permits a factually guilty defendant to
escape conviction in order to punish and discourage a separate
illegal act by government officials. The exclusionary rule
serves the rule of law by enforcing constitutional rules; it is a
protection against officials acting lawlessly, i.e., outside their
authority, even out of good motives or to serve legitimate goals.
In this scenario, then, the established general principle a jury
might seek to reconcile with its law application task is readily
available and clearly established. A nullification verdict in this
context works on the same principle that justifies exclusionary
rules of probative evidence. The acquittal of a murderer is a
high price to pay for such enforcement, but Fourth and Fifth
Amendment exclusionary rules have already decided that the
price is worth paying.1" 5 Our Simpson-like hypothetical not-
withstanding, because the price is so high, we would expect ju-
rors to use nullification in murder cases only rarely. Lesser
crimes, such as drug possession, are more likely occasions for
nullification, especially if official misconduct is especially evi-
dent. Such a decision draws support not only from the princi-
ple inherent in the exclusionary rule, but also from other
means for excusing culpable defendants in order to punish
other wrongdoers. Prosecutorial grants of immunity, for ex-
ample, work exactly this way: one criminal actor is given, a
since judges usually reach the same outcomes through less conscious, more
instinctual mental processes developed in judicial practice. See DwoRKIN, su-
pra note 54; ef Paul J. Heald & James E. Heald, Mindlessness and Law, 77
VA. L. REV. 1127, 1152-63 (1991) (arguing that "script theory" suggests that
people can rationally respond to the incentive effects of rules even when a
large portion of people lack full knowledge of the rule or complete information
relevant to decisions regarding the rule).
105. The same is true of many nonconstitutional evidentiary rules that ex-
clude evidence. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 501; GLEN WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL
EVIDENCE §§ 501.6-501.8 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing spousal, clergyman-
parishioner, and psychiatrist-patient privileges).
Again, jurors need not have full knowledge of all laws and principles in
order to reach this decision. See supra note 104 (demonstrating that rational
legal decisionmaking does not require omniscience). In particular, this judg-
ment does not require that jurors be informed of the exclusionary rule via in-
structions from the judge. The exclusionary rule in particular, as a result of
political controversy surrounding it for the last three decades, is one constitu-
tional practice of which many citizens have a working knowledge.
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guarantee of nonpunishment in exchange for help in convicting
another. 106
Additionally, as discussed in more detail below in the con-
text of Butler's proposal, 1 7 nullification motivated by condem-
nation of official illegal actions such as perjury and improper
searches serves instrumental goals that contribute to its justi-
fication. It discourages such conduct in the future as well as
rejects on principle evidence "tainted" by illegality. It also
lessens the likelihood that such illegality will be used dispro-
portionately against some groups of citizens disfavored by dis-
cretionary government actors such as the police, thereby serving
a broader antidiscrimination and equal-treatment principle.0 '
These instrumental concerns support a judgment that, when
reconciling just application of a just law with sanction of offi-
cial misconduct, the latter takes precedence over the former.
One might argue it is improper for the jury to make as-
sessments about violations of law other than those with which
the defendant is charged in the indictment, and then to impose
a self-designed sanction in the form of a not-guilty verdict. In
other words, even if the decision is substantively correct, the
jury is still the inappropriate body to make it. 109 Certainly it
diverts the jury from the task that criminal law posits as its
primary purpose: to assess criminal culpability of the defen-
dant. Three points respond to that argument. First, the fact
that juries get the decision substantively correct (by identifying
and punishing perjury that prosecutors have suborned, or ille-
gal searches that judges permitted) when other officials
charged with doing so have failed argues for both the necessity
and the appropriateness of the jury's decision. The jury may
not seem a trustworthy institution for this assessment, but by
implication other officials have already proven untrustworthy
as well. Second, to the extent jurors consider issues beyond the
defendant's culpability, they correctly realize that criminal
106. See, e.g., HUMES, supra note 102, at 269 (describing the grant of im-
munity to an adult murder suspect, against whom evidence was strong, in or-
der to secure his testimony against a juvenile co-defendant).
107. See infra notes 141-161 and accompanying text (describing Butler's
argument that nullification should be used by juries to protect the biased
application of the laws).
108. Whether the jury, a majoritarian institution-with a de facto minority
veto built in by the rule of unanimity-is a body likely to uphold these princi-
ples against unpopular citizens is open for debate.
109. On the distinction between the merit and appropriateness of a propo-
sition, see KADISH & KADISH, supra note 68, at 8.
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adjudication is only a part of a larger scheme of the rule of law.
A just and ordered society requires not only that private citi-
zens who violate criminal laws be punished, 10 but that public
officials-which liberalism identifies as the greatest threat to
individual liberty-be restrained by law as well. Our law of
criminal procedure trades off culpability determinations and
punishment for several competing values threatened by official
actors, including privacy and nondiscrimination.
Finally, the structure of jury authority implies a faith that
juries are both trustworthy and cautious with the nullification
power. The rule that verdicts of acquittal are unreviewable
empowers the jury and privileges its judgments over those of
judges. It thereby implies a prudential trust in the jury even
to make decisions such as trading off convictions for perjury or
privacy violations. Particularly on the issue of perjury, the
jury traditionally has been viewed as fully competent to make
that determination, in as much as it is their task to determine
witness credibility."' Moreover, we assume juries will be cau-
tious with nullification power because they are instructed not
to use it, or at least are not instructed that they have such
power.1 2 Thus juries are likely to require substantial reasons,
110. It bears keeping in mind that jurors who make such judgments are
not the only ones allowing crimes to go unpunished for other reasons. Police
and prosecutors regularly decline to arrest and prosecute clear criminal activ-
ity (though admittedly, such crimes are usually less serious than homicide) for
a variety of acceptable policy reasons (not to mention unacceptable ones, such
as favoritism).
111. As for unconstitutional searches, on the other hand, it may well- be
that the jury is not competent to make that legal determination accurately
most of the time, especially when it is not instructed on Fourth Amendment
law by the judge. But some have argued that they should be given that task.
See, e.g., Ronald J. Bacigal, Putting the People Back into the Fourth Amend-
ment, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 359, 402-28 (1994) (proposing an increased role
for juries in Fourth Amendment deliberation). Additionally, the U.S. Su-
preme Coures gloss on the Fourth Amendment, tying the concept of
"unreasonable searches" to community expectations of privacy, suggests a
standard that lay jurors are competent to handle. See Christopher Slobogin &
Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in
Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings Recognized
and Permitted by Society," 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 772-73 (1993) (concluding that
lay jurors are capable of balancing the interests of crime control and privacy);
see Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131,
1190-95 (1991) (discussing Framers' view that the Constitution was accessible
to lay citizens rather than being a lawyer's "prolix code").
112. Only two states, Indiana and Maryland, still allow instructions in-
forming the jury of its nullification power, with perhaps one or two others al-
lowing defense attorneys to argue--without supporting instruction from thejudge-that the jury can exercise nullification power.
117719971
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
like serious official misconduct, before breaching the instruc-
tion to return a verdict of not guilty when the evidence over-
comes reasonable doubt.11 3 The trust of juries that is built into
the structure of their authority seems plausible given the jury's
local and majoritarian nature. Juries are, after all, a group of
local citizens who must live in the community into which they
either might set criminals free or live with officials who violate
rules. In light of that, the jury seems an appropriately cau-
tious body to trust with the power to make such trade-offs. The
point remains, however, that regardless of whether jurors are
good at using nullification powers to punish official wrongdo-
ing, nullification in such cases, done for such reasons, is consis-
tent with the rule of law.
B. UNJUST LAWS: NULLIFICATION IN RESPONSE TO NORM
VIOLATIONS
Consider now a second circumstance under which juries
are tempted to nullify convictions: prosecutions under an un-
just law. The problem here is that, without responding to ille-
gal acts by officials, jurors simply refuse to enforce a valid
(although in their minds unjust) statute."4 While such deci-
113. See KADISH & KADISH, supra note 68, at 27-29, 62 (suggesting that
citizens and officials, before departing from mandatory rules, will insist on a
.surcharge" in the form of especially strong reasons that justify breaching
rules in order to serve a meritorious end).
Because the jury system requires the conscientious juror to distinguish
between departing from an instruction at will and departing from an instruc-
tion because he has a "damned good reason" for doing so as determined by the
end he is committed to serve, the jury role retains the obligatory status of the
judge's instructions while permitting departures from them.
A videotape of an actual jury reaching an acquittal decision that is
probably nullification supports the contention that jurors are cautious and re-
quire compelling reasons to acquit in the face of evidence. See Frontline: In-
side the Jury Room (PBS 1986).
The empirical evidence on the effect of nullification instructions is limited
and yields somewhat mixed results. See Irwin A. Horowitz, Jury Nullifica-
tion: The Impact of Judicial Instructions, Arguments and Challenges on Jury
Decision Making, 12 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 450-52 (1988) [hereinafter Hor-
owitz, The Impact of Judicial Instructions] (observing that nullification proce-
dures affect jury decisionmaking, but in variable degrees, depending on fac-
tual and procedural context); Irwin A. Horowitz, The Effect of Jury
Nullification Instructions on Verdicts and Jury Functioning in Criminal Tri-
als, 9 L. & HUM. BEHAv. 25, 34-36 (1985) [hereinafter Horowitz, The Effect of
Jury Nullification] (observing that nullification instructions change jury be-
havior without conclusively determining what the change entails).
114. See, e.g., United States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323, 1331 (C.C.D. Mass.
1851) (No. 15,815) (overturning jury acquittal of three defendants accused un-
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sions arise in different circumstances than the preceding sce-
nario, the verdict similarly contravenes the rule of law. Strong
historical precedent supports these decisions as well, through
one widely viewed as among the most honorable and just tra-
ditions of nullification: the refusal of northern juries before the
Civil War to convict defendants under the Fugitive Slave Act of
1850."'
There are two ways to approve of such verdicts. One is
outside rule-of-law terms. That is, one can assert that the rule
of law in these instances is unjust when assessed by, say, natu-
ral law or some scheme of moral justice.116 David Lyons, for in-
stance, has argued that officials are never absolutely bound to
implement unjust laws; the "scope of such obligation is not de-
termined just by the law but also by moral considerations that
are independent of the law."11 This is the argument of many
nullification proponents, and it is Butler's justification for nul-
lification in a slightly different circumstance: the law is unjust,
so we have to violate the rule of law to achieve real justice.118
It is an argument most people agree with for some historical or
der the Fugitive Slave Act of aiding and abetting a runaway slave after de-
fense counsel informed the jury of its power to judge the law).
115. For a discussion of Fugitive Slave Act nullification verdicts and the
wide perception of their correctness, see ABRAMSON, supra note 1, at 80-85.
Other examples of unpopular law prompting nullification include England's
eighteenth century "Bloody Code," in which juries nullified convictions for the
long series of crimes that carried a mandatory death penalty, see generally
JEROME HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SocIETY 126-32 (2d ed. 1952); FRANK
MCLYNN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND (1991),
and American jury's systematic nullification of Prohibition laws in the early
twentieth century, see HARRY KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY
291 (1966) (calling that trend "the most intense example of jury revolt in re-
cent history-).
The historical example of Nazi law raises the same issue of popular disa-
greement (though it was not challenged by nullification). That experience led
many commentators, such as Gustav Radbruch, to conclude that the rule of
law must be integrated with, and checked by, substantive "principles of law"
that define obligation in terms beyond strict adherence to positive law. See
Radbruch, supra note 46, at 109 (arguing that statutes that are inconsistent
with broader "principles of law" are "devoid of legality"); see also LYONS, supra
note 39, at 85-86 (using Nazi law as an example in discussing the moral limits
of obligation to positive law).
116. See, e.g., GREENAWALT, supra note 3, at 359-67 (identifying nullifica-
tion as one technique for ameliorating conflict between law and morality).
117. LYONS, supra note 39, at 84; see also Butler, supra note 3, at 679
(asserting that extra-legal considerations give rise to a "moral responsibility"
of black jurors to "emancipate some guilty black outlaws" via nullification).
118. See infra Part II.C (discussing nullification as a response to unjust
applications of law).
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contemporary example, but which many are afraid to use as a
basis for entrusting juries with explicit nullification power.
Alternatively, we can explain the nullification of fugitive
slave law prosecutions within rule-of-law terms."9 This expla-
nation can take a number of forms. For one, we could argue
the unjust statute was enacted by a deeply flawed governmen-
tal structure.2 ' African Americans were denied the ability to
vote and thus denied representation in the governmental bod-
ies that enacted that law and carried out its administration.
On this approach, which is appealing to process theorists 121
and more critical scholars, 122 the undemocratic structure of
government that produced the statutes subverts the validity of
the rule of law. 123  Nullification was a response to a deeper,
prior injustice that allowed the improper enactment of an un-
just statute that was not the product of full democratic delib-
eration or citizen input, and thus not worthy of citizen respect.
This rationale raises line-drawing problems, much like
those cited by critics of Ely's process theory of judicial re-
119. But see Butler, supra note 3, at 705-06 (noting that the jurors who
disregarded the fugitive slave law did subvert majoritarian processes, how-
ever flawed, and presumably were subjected to harsh criticism).
120. See LYONS, supra note 39, at 85-86 (citing unfairness of legislative
process as one factor supporting departure from strict adherence to law).
121. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 138-45, 152 (1980) (arguing for augmented judicial review
where the democratic process was undermined by procedural barriers, such as
disenfranchisement or gerrymandered electoral districts, or marred by irra-
tional prejudice such as racism).
122. I suggest this approach appeals to critical scholars because it attacks
unspoken baselines or assumptions upon which the validity of a law is de-
termined. For examples of critical examinations of comparable baseline is-
sues in a variety of contexts, see, for example, Jack M. Beermann & Joseph
William Singer, Baseline Questions in Legal Reasoning: The Example of Prop-
erty in Jobs, 23 GA. L. REV. 911, 912-16 (1989) (applying baseline for doctrinal
conclusions about legal protection of job security); Duncan Kennedy, Cost-
Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387,
413-19 (1981) (employing baseline analysis to undermine the determinacy of
law and economics arguments); Gary Peller, Criminal Law, Race and the Ide-
ology of Bias: Transcending the Critical Tools of the Sixties, 67 TUL. L. REV.
2231, 2233-34 (1993) (discussing the nature of racial bias in substantive
criminal law).
123. This assumes, however, that fldl enfranchisement and representation
would have precluded passage of the fugitive slave law, a proposition that is
unverifiable. Nonetheless, historical evidence supports this hypothesis; once
African Americans effectively gained the franchise beginning in the 1960s,
stronger civil rights laws were enacted and many fewer overtly oppressive
policies adopted, even though blacks never came close to controlling majorities
in any state or national body.
1180 [Vol. 81:1149
JURY NULLIFICATION
view.12 4 These critics note that all statutes are susceptible to
this attack, since no electoral or legislative process is perfectly
representative and deliberative.125 At most, then, jurors (like
judges employing Ely's theory of review) are deciding a ques-
tion of degree, and thereby making substantive assessments
that look more political than neutral and law-like. The re-
sponse is that the new rule-of-law conceptions at issue here
were prompted precisely by the recognition that, at some level,
a political or moral choice comes into play in any application of
law. How damaging one finds this response depends on
whether one sees this insight as turning all law into politics, or
alternatively, as a manageable and tolerable fact that still al-
lows law to be distinguished from politics or purely moral de-
bate. The new interpretive and pragmatic approaches to the
rule of law take the latter view. One may argue more broadly
that these approaches are wrong on that point. The thesis of
this Article, however, is more limited; it suggests only that
nullification fits within these widely held pragmatic or inter-
pretive understandings of the rule of law.
Alternatively, in Dworkinian terms, we might identify
such a statute as "internally compromised"126 and condemn it
as unprincipled and inconsistent with the "underlying com-
mitment to [a] ... more fundamental public conception of jus-
tice."127 The citizen's, and particularly the juror's, "[plolitical
124. See, e.g., Daniel Ortiz, Pursuing a Perfect Politics: The Allure and
Failure of Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 721, 741-42 (1991) (critiquing Ely's
theory on the grounds that substantive judgments are unavoidable in judicial
review); Laurence Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitu-
tional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1064 (1980) (same).
125. Voting rights and election law scholars have noted that a great vari-
ety of electoral structures exist by which legislative bodies can be popularly
elected. For example, various electoral structures can yield very different
memberships in the legislature, yet most such options are perceived as demo-
cratic and legitimate. See generally Symposium, Regulating the Electoral
Process, 71 TEx. L. REV. 1409 (1993) (discussing numerous voting systems and
their implications). Once the legislature's membership is set, the outcomes it
produces may vary greatly depending on, among other things, its choice of in-
ternal procedural and decision-making rules. Much political science research
has focused on this topic in recent decades. For brief summaries of this schol-
arship and citation to sources, see generally Darryl K Brown, Structure and
Relationship in the Jurisprudence of Juries: Comparing the Capital Sentenc-
ing and Punitive Damages Doctrines, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1255 (1996); Saul
Levmore, Parlimentary Law, Majoritarian Decisionmaking, and the Voting
Paradox, 75 VA. L. REV. 971, 984-1011 (1989).
126. See DWORKIN, supra note 54, at 187 (arguing for a notion of political
integrity that "takes the community itself as a moral agent").
127. Id. at 189.
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obligation is then not just a matter of obeying the discrete po-
litical decisions of the community one by one"128 in such forms
as the fugitive slave statute. Political obligation--even in the
role of juror-demands instead "fidelity to a scheme of princi-
ple each citizen has a responsibility to identify, ultimately for
himself, as his community's scheme." 29  In Dworkin's view,
laws "count as legal" only when they "follow from the principles
of personal and political morality the explicit decisions presup-
pose by way of justification."' 30
One could reach the same explanation for lawful nullifica-
tion in this instance by using Radin's or Eskridge's approaches,
for the written statute here contravenes widely held social con-
ventions and norms, as the consistent pattern of nullification ver-
dicts demonstrated. Even before the post-Civil War amendments
that strengthened constitutional antidiscrimination norms, com-
pelling public values existed strongly enough to produce the pat-
tern of jury sentiment against the fugitive slave law. The rule
of law requires citizen-jurors as well as judges to reconcile
other sources of law with the statute in the process of law ap-
plication. The use of local juries, the protection given their
nullification power, and the tradition of judicial opinion laud-
ing the jury's mediation of federal law (and prosecutorial
judgment) with local sentiment' are institutional-procedural
means of insuring that written law is interpreted through the
public norms and social conventions we now understand as
part of the law. We call the verdict "nullification" because the
facts were proven that put the defendant in violation of the
statute; yet the verdict occurs within the rule of law because of
the sources that led the jury to refuse to apply the statute to
the facts. 13 2
128. Id. at 190.
129. Id. at 187-90 (emphasis added).
130. Id. at 196.
131. See Brown, supra note 125; Brown, supra note 1, at 113-20.
132. Here we see the strength of Fletcher's argument that "nullification" is
an inappropriate label for many verdicts through which juries refused to ap-
ply a statute. See supra note 18 (discussing Fletcher's position on nullifica-
tion). Many "nullification" verdicts, Fletcher argues, should be viewed as
"perfecting" or "refining" the law, a description that fits well with the way we
now understand the rule of law to include more than written or positive law.
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C. NULLIFICATION IN RESPONSE TO BIASED OR UNJUST LAW
APPLICATION
A third circumstance in which juries are likely to nullify
convictions are those prosecutions in which a just law seems
unjustly applied. This class of cases raises a different set of
problems from the preceding circumstance, in which the law
itself seemed unjust because of its clash with widely held
norms, regardless of its application. It differs also from our
first example of juries refusing to justly apply a just law in or-
der to respond to official lawlessness. As an issue of statutory
application, we can find some insight into the difficulties that
lead to nullification in this third context from the extensive lit-
erature on judicial interpretation of statutes, which reveals
that judges forego literal statute applications at times in order
to respond to present social, political, and legal context.
Within this third scenario, jurors might find a statute is
unjustly applied by the prosecutor for any of several reasons.
For one, the prescribed punishment may seem unjustly harsh
on the defendant, even though the guilty verdict would be ap-
propriate.133 One might put juror reaction to harsh "three-
strikes" laws in this category if, as there is some indication,
those laws have prompted nullification by California juries.
One might also put into this category the well documented pat-
tern of eighteenth century jury nullification in response to
England's "Bloody Code," which mandated capital punishment
for a long list of crimes including nonviolent, property offenses.
Many defendants undoubtedly deserved conviction for, say,
theft, but juries nullified because death was an excessively
harsh sentence.34 Juries looked beyond the text of the crimi-
nal statute to the social context and result of a literal applica-
tion to arrive at such nullification verdicts.
Alternatively, law application may seem inappropriate
when the function of criminal law poorly fits the individual de-
fendant's circumstance.'35 For an example of this problem,
133. See Sauer, supra note 19, at 1260-69 (arguing for juries being in-
formed of the sentencing consequences a defendant will face if convicted, and
discussing nullification favorably).
134. See generally MCLYNN, supra note 115 (detailing popular response to
the "Bloody Code").
135. For a discussion of the distinction between punishments that are dis-
proportionate in relation to the offense committed and those that are dispro-
portionate in light of lesser sentences given to other defendants for the same
crime in comparable contexts, see Baldus et al., supra note 92, at 665.
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consider the prosecution of a parent for vehicular homicide for
the death of a child in a car accident after the parent failed to
use a child-safety seat as required by law.136 Here, the prose-
cution clearly has strong negligence-per-se grounds under the
statute; literal application could seem to compel a guilty ver-
dict. 37 Also, criminal law conceptually distinguishes between
punishment imposed by the state and private suffering that a
defendant may experience as punishment. Criminal law the-
ory may thereby justify the prosecution on that ground, as well
as on a general deterrence theory. Nevertheless, many people
are likely to see the prosecution of a grieving parent as inap-
propriate. 138 This sort of law application can be understood as
unjust in relation to the individual defendant; although the
case fits the letter of the statute, the societal consensus is that
the general rule was not designed for this individual case, nor
should it be.'39 Apparent legislative purpose combines with
widely held norms and broader purposes of criminal punish-
ment to counsel against such an application. A jury rendering
a not-guilty verdict on this reasoning looks similar to a judge
who interprets a statute non-literally and "dynamically" in
light of social context, statutory purpose, and public norms.1 40
136. For a discussion of one such prosecution, see FINKEL, supra note 1, at
34.
137. Id.
138. Finkel recounts comments of potential jurors in such a case as includ-
ing, "to be put on trial for [the death of one's child] is a horrible thing," and
"he's being crucified... to prove the law." Id. Finkel speculates the directed
verdict that ended the case before it got to the jury was "judicial nullification
of a bad law." Id.
139. See id. (recounting an attorney's assertion that "the community at
large is not in favor of these prosecutions"); cf. Sunstein, supra note 52, at
752-53 (discussing mediation of general principles through individualized no-
tions of proper case outcomes).
140. See WILLIAM N. ESKR IDGE & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MA.
TERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
604-06 (2d ed. 1995) (describing dynamic theories of interpretation as those
which recognize changes in social context, intervening policy considerations,
and changes in circumstance). Murder prosecutions of battered women who
kill their batterers in purported self-defense raise a similar problem. Some
scholars who study such cases see juries responding to those prosecutions
with nullification verdicts because the substantive law of self-defense, devel-
oped in the context of more traditional self-defense actions, does not always fit
the battered-woman context. See, e.g., Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense,
Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their Batterers, 71 N.C. L. REV. 371, 410-11
(1993) (urging revision of self-defense law to eliminate the imminence re-
quirement, partly in response to "[tihe continuing reports of jury nullification
in [such] cases... [which] may signal that the present law of self-defense has
been outstripped by society's changing morality").
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Finally, Professor Butler's proposal for strategic nullifica-
tion as a means to protest law enforcement and racially biased
social policies fits into this description of unjust statute appli-
cations for other reasons. Butler argues that African American
jurors should refuse to convict some clearly guilty African
American defendants as a legitimate response to biased law en-
forcement and criminal justice administration, and to the "racial
and economic subordination every African American faces
every day."141 Those biased policies, he argues, put such a dis-
proportionate percentage of African American men under the
control of criminal justice authorities that the system consti-
tutes a police state vis-a-vis the black community." His
premise is that inequitable policies and administration are a
substantial cause of high African American arrest, conviction
and incarceration rates. He notes, for instance, that police in-
ordinately target the black community for investigation and
charging even though their rates of drug use and sale are
roughly the same as that for white communities.14 1 In response
to biased enforcement and inequitable social policy, Butler
suggests that, in nonviolent malum prohibitum crimes such as
narcotics possession, black jurors. should start with a pre-
sumption in favor of nullification for black defendants.' 44 Ad-
ditionally, they should consider it an option for nonviolent ma-
lum in se crimes such as theft or burglary.145
Butler's cases for nullification differ from the first class
discussed in Part ll.A, in that law enforcement officials and
social policymakers, while by hypothesis biased, have not
breached legal rules. His proposal differs also from the cases of
Part HB in that the laws being nullified 146 are not themselves
unjust or in contradiction of widely held community norms and
141. Butler, supra note 3, at 680 (noting his goal is "the subversion of
American criminal justice, at least as it now exists").
142. See id. at 690-91 (providing empirical and anecdotal evidence in sup-
port of the analogy).
143. See id. at 690-700 (noting statistical and anecdotal examples of une-
qual treatment of blacks in the criminal justice system and detailing the
strengths and weaknesses of various critiques of that system).
144. Id. at 715.
145. See id. at 715-22 (suggesting a framework for applying jury nullifica-
tion and offering hypothetical examples).
146. See id. at 715 (distinguishing between violent and nonviolent crimes
and between malum in se and malum prohibitum offenses in suitability forjury nullification).
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practices. Nor is the punishment strikingly inappropriate in
relation to the defendant's crime and circumstance.
To understand the proposal in rule-of-law terms, it helps
to divide Butler's motivating factors. The first is grounded
broadly in criminal justice and social policies that allocate dis-
proportionate resources into criminal law enforcement and the
penal system while allotting inadequate resources to educa-
tion, social service and racial justice agendas. 147 One is hard-
pressed here to find a rule-of-law violation analogous to police
perjury. Butler defends this argument in two ways. Building
on voting rights and legislative-process scholarship, he adopts
the critique of electoral structures and rules for legislative de-
cisionmaking, and argues that African American interests are
underrepresented in policy outcomes. 148 The laws produced by
a flawed democratic process have a weak claim to legitimacy,
particularly on those most disadvantaged by them. This sup-
ports Butler's other point about the illegitimacy of public policy
decisions. Butler accepts one of the Supreme Court's key ra-
tionales for representative juries but emphasizes an implica-
tion the Court overlooked. The Court has suggested that ra-
cially mixed juries increase the legitimacy and appearance of
impartiality in the criminal justice system.149 But if black ju-
rors feel the system is biased or illegitimate, they should dem-
onstrate that sentiment via nullification so as not to wrongly
endorse a flawed system that is in need of repair. 5 ° To legiti-
mize a biased system by uncritically participating in it only
facilitates its flaws and thereby disserves the rule of law.
The role Butler proposes for black jurors need not be
viewed as outside the rule of law. Juries are democratic insti-
tutions serving a check-and-balance function against flawed
decisionmaking by other institutions (legislatures, police,
prosecutors). Their verdicts not only fulfill the task the Su-
preme Court intends for it-signaling the state of the justice
147. See id. at 690-97 (detailing the backdrop of discrimination in the
criminal justice system); id. at 712 (arguing nullification may be justified if
one agrees that "the American ideal of equality under law" does not apply to
African Americans and that "criminal law is applied in a discriminatory fash-
ion").
148. See id. at 709-12 (citing Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive
Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REV. 1413 (1991)).
149. See id. at 712-14 (citing as examples Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S.
42, 49 (1992); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986); Balzac v. Porto Rico,
258 U.S. 298, 310 (1922)).
150. See id. at 714.
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system's legitimacy-but broadly contribute to an ongoing,
democratic dialogue among institutional players that facili-
tates law reform.1 51 Contributions to that dialogue are espe-
cially appropriate since such nullification decisions would be
motivated by rule-of-law concerns. In Dworkinian terms, black
jurors identify the moral incoherence and lack of integrity of
law (with a strong distributional justice emphasis) with ver-
dicts that insist on the reconciliation of social policy and crimi-
nal justice administration with individual case adjudication.
Alternatively, we could describe jurors as confronting an inter-
pretive dilemma; they must reconcile literal application of
statutes with the sorts of competing concerns arising from so-
cial and political contexts that judges consider when they in-
terpret statutes in light of strongly felt public values or seem-
ingly perverse outcomes.'52 Like judges, juries that engage in
such a "dynamic" rather than narrowly literalist interpretive
process still can be understood as acting within the rule of
law.1 53
151. For a discussion of the jury as an institution reacting to and prompt-
ing responses from other government institutions, see Brown, supra note 125.
152. Butler's thesis invites comparison to the considerable literature on
"dynamic" statutory interpretation. Dynamic interpretation theory suggests,
in brief, that judges do not statically interpret statutes under the stricture of
a guiding limitation such as the drafter's intent or the statute's purpose. See
William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 321-24 (1990) (outlining the criticisms of
originalist statutory construction and advocating an alternative "dynamic"
model); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U.
PA. L. REv. 1479, 1481-82 (1987) (same). Rather, this theory proposes that
they interpret statutes "in light of their present social, political, and legal con-
text." Id. at 1479; see id. at 1483 ("The dialectic of statutory interpretation is
the process of understanding a text created in the past and applying it to a
present problem."). Traditional interpretive guideposts, such as textual lit-
eralism or legislative purpose, will seem more or less compelling and appro-
priate depending on the result they would yield. See id. at 1483-84 (applying
traditional interpretive techniques within the model of dynamic interpreta-
tion). Traditional interpretation may be less appropriate when a case is not
"easy," as when literal application provides a disposition that seems strikingly
wrong. See Sunstein, supra note 52, at 750-53 (discussing legal reasoning as a
search for equilibrium between application of general principles and particu-
larized judgments about correct outcomes in individual cases). Likewise,
when the "statutory text is not clear and the original legislative expectations
have been overtaken by subsequent changes in society and law.., the pull of
text and history will be relatively slight, and the interpreter will find current
policies and societal conditions most important." Eskridge, Dynamic Statu-
tory Interpretation, supra, at 1484.
153. There are, of course, significant differences between judicial statutory
interpretation and jury application of law given in jury instructions. Aside
from whether those two interpreters may have different mandates or scopes
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In light of preceding discussions, Butler's second argument
for nullification is easier to reconcile with the rule of law. He
posits nullification as an appropriate response to specific pat-
terns of law enforcement decisions leading to disproportionate
results. These patterns include discretionary choices to target
limited investigation resources in black communities, to arrest
particular types of violators rather than others, and to charge
them with certain offenses rather than others.'54 In his view,
those choices have devastating consequences for the African
American community. 55 These choices of law enforcement of-
ficials are lawful in the narrow sense that they violate no law
or doctrine such as equal protection. Each case in isolation
may be a just application in that the defendant met the ele-
ments of a just law. 56 But in Butler's account they constitute
injustice in the sense that they hold more blacks than whites
liable for the same offenses, and do so within a context in
which African Americans had less opportunity to avoid crimi-
nal behavior in the first place. 5 7
Thus discretionary enforcement has reached a stage of bias
that compromises the criminal justice system generally. 158 We
of authority, juries lack access to legislative history or law (including case
precedent and related statutes) not included in the judge's instructions. Nev-
ertheless, the literature on judicial statutory interpretation holds some ex-
planatory insight for why juries may resist the literal, mechanical application
of law that is often expected of them.
154. Butler, supra note 3, at 691-92.
155. See id. at 695 (noting the economic and social costs of the dispropor-
tionately high incarceration rates of black males).
156. This conclusion leaves aside what I take to be Butler's closely related
point: social contexts for many African American citizens put them at such a
disadvantage in avoiding criminal liability that the lack of an equal baseline,
or starting point, makes a judgment about their guilt illegitimate within the
biased social and criminal justice system. See id. at 693-94 (noting that the
majority of African Americans are not afforded the educational and employ-
ment opportunities necessary to succeed in American society).
157. Id. Under a formal conception of free will, everyone has the same op-
portunity to choose or decline criminal action. The premise here, in contrast,
is that some people have effectively less opportunity to avoid criminal behav-
ior for a variety of reasons, including diminished economic opportunity that
makes criminal behavior more attractive, greater pressure from peers and
community members indicating that criminal behavior is acceptable or justi-
fied, or a social-economic position that gives little stake in (and generates
hostility toward) mainstream social-economic activity. See id. at 694 ("Not
everyone exposed to a virus will become sick, but that does not mean that the
virus does not cause the illness of the people who do.").
158. Arguments of the legitimacy of such action gain force as well from
recognition that all institutional actors in the context of criminal law en-
forcement are exercising broad-based discretion that is regulated only at the
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have already noted how rule-of-law scholars concede rule ap-
plication cannot occur outside a normative-political context. In
Dworkin's terms, for example, adjudication cannot occur with-
out reference to the moral coherence of a "total set of laws" and
their administration.1 59 Responding to the injustice of legisla-
tive and administrative decisionmaking is a necessary part,
within the rule of law, of the jury's case adjudication function.
Moreover, such a response builds on an established principle
and public value in constitutional law. A criminal sanction can
be excessive in comparison to similar cases, even if it is not
disproportionate in relation to individual culpability.16° Butler
argues for extending this principle, in effect, to nullify sen-
tences when comparable, nonwhite citizens have not been
similarly targeted by law enforcement administration.
16 1
Nullification of unjust applications of law highlights a
puzzling aspect of the condemnation of such jury decisions. We
fully accept that prosecutors have discretion to apply criminal
law or not according to their own judgment, into which they are
readily allowed to consider moral or social policy factors well
beyond the facts' relation to statutory elements. Rare is the
contention that prosecutorial discretion is "lawless," as opposed
to merely ill-advised. Yet a jury making essentially the same
judgment-thus double-checking the prosecutor's choice by
extremes by positive law. Police and prosecutors have tremendous leeway to
set criminal justice policy. See, e.g., PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ROOSTER'S EGG
92-93 (1995) (discussing an example of prosecutorial discretion in criminal
charging that demonstrates how social bias about non-legal factors, such as
the physical appearance of the victim, affect such decisions). Jury nullifica-
tion is the addition of another institutional actor employing discretionary
power inherent in the application of law. It is problematic only to the extent
one distrusts jurors' discretionary judgment more than police or prosecutors'
judgment. Refusing to convict a factually guilty defendant is a decision iden-
tical to decisions police and prosecutors make when they sometimes elect not
to arrest or prosecute a factually guilty citizen.
159. See DWORKIN, supra note 54, at 177.
160. See Baldus et al., supra note 92, at 663-72 (discussing the concept of
"corporate excessiveness" in the context of evaluating capital sentencing un-
der the Eighth Amendment).
161. Butler's argument, once reconceived in rule-of-law terms, provides a
basis, in addition to the one he offers for rejecting white jurors' acquittals of
white defendants. See Butler, supra note 3, at 722. Whites as a class can
claim no comparable injury from criminal justice administration; they have no
similarly principled basis or compelling normative argument for acquittals as
a response to systemic bias. (This is not to say a similar critique could not oc-
cur on a different axis, such as economic class.) Whites nullifying solely in
response to seeing black jurors putting Butler's proposal into effect would not
be acting on any norm, value, or principle recognized in rule of law accounts.
Id.
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deciding whether it finds compelling reasons to nullify rather
than endorse the prosecutor's application of law-faces the
traditional objections of bias, irrationality, or subversion of the
democratic process. As the foregoing discussion seeks to dem-
onstrate, juries that nullify on the basis of norms and sources
that we recognize as within the rule of law (and that judges
employ in their interpretive practice) are acting at least as law-
fully as one finds in routine exercises of prosecutorial discre-
tion. 62 Both are made on the basis of factors other than
whether the facts fulfill a literal reading of the elements of the
crime. Also, since nullification occurs only in the form of ac-
quittals and not convictions, this checking function serves a
key purpose of the rule of law-detection of enforcement
abuse.'63 Nullification decisions check prosecutorial discretion
against the public values and social norms we recognize from
judicial interpretation of statutes and from the full description
of the rule of law.
Most decisionmakers in our legal system have discretion-
ary capacity effectively to nullify laws. Not only juries, prose-
cutors, and judges, 164 but private attorneys as well often have
opportunity to counsel clients and direct legal proceedings in a
way that circumvents obedience to and enforcement of statutes
and rules.'65 All may, and presumably do, sometimes exercise
162. One might argue that the proper way to protest or change prosecuto-
rial discretion is to vote out elected district attorneys at the next election and
to use the more attenuated democratic processes (e.g., pressure on executive
branch) to dismiss appointed federal prosecutors. But realistically, those op-
tions are impractical due to information costs and collective action problems.
Few citizens have the luxury of focusing significant attention to discretionary
policies of prosecutors and thereafter making a judgment about opposing
those policies. Fewer still could successfully organize group opposition, in
large part because fellow citizens face the same information costs and time
restraints. But citizens are forced to learn in detail about particular outcomes
of discretionary law enforcement choices when called to serve as jurors, in-
formation which they add to (and interpret through) general background
knowledge of the type Butler describes about discriminatory law enforcement
policy. See id. at 695-96 (noting examples of racism in criminal justice). An
easy opportunity for action is presented in the form of jury service. Thus, as a
practical matter, jury service may present the only effective way for citizens
to closely examine and effectively respond to law enforcement discretion.
163. Cf. KADISH & KADISH, supra note 68, at 53; Barnett, supra note 28, at
616, 641 (discussing enforcement abuse).
164. See generally GuiDo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF
STATUTES 163-66 (1982) (offering a theory that judges should nullify obsolete
statutes that legislatures refuse or neglect to repeal).
165. See William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1083, 1116-18 (1988) (describing lawyers, as well as judges and juries, as
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that nullification power based on legal considerations, broadly
understood. This is what distinguishes whether we under-
stand such actions as lawful or lawless. If they are "grounded
in the norms and practices of the surrounding legal culture"
and "have observable regularity and are mutually meaningful
to those who refer to and engage in them," 66 then they can be
understood as occurring within the dominant conception of the
rule of law. Decisions on such grounds undoubtedly are often
controversial, but they are not illegitimate. How the jury car-
ries out its job of applying law, then, even when it nullifies, is
not different in kind from how prosecutors, judges, and attor-
neys interpret and enforce laws. There may remain a pruden-
tial concern that lay citizens are not as good at this process as
lawyers. Nevertheless, whether jury decisions are unlawful
must be determined on the same basis as we assess whether
other decisionmakers have acted lawlessly. That determina-
tion is made not by checking whether a rule's literal language
was applied to every fact pattern it could conceivably govern,
but whether the inevitably substantive, contextual decision to
apply it was made on grounds beyond the text that our legal
culture widely recognizes as legitimate.
D. NULLIFICATION TO UPHOLD ILLEGAL AND IMMORAL
COMMUNITY NORMS
The sorts of verdict that many seem to consider typical of
nullification are the acquittals by all-white, southern juries of
white defendants who killed, assaulted, or harassed civil rights
activists or African Americans generally.167 None of the factors
all having "nullifying powers"). Simon offers as an example of attorney nulli-
fication a lawyer who, representing one spouse in an amicable divorce, must
decide how to achieve the divorce under a state law that requires fault, such
as adultery or mental cruelty. See id. at 1116. The lawyer must decide
whether to counsel the client to commit peijury and allege such fault, or, if he
has decided to do so without encouragement, whether to report it to the court.
Id. By encouraging or tacitly permitting peijury, the lawyer nullifies the fault
requirement of the divorce statute. Noting that while most commentators and
court rules do not condone the peijury strategy, Simon observes that lawyers
in fact have "a broad range of practical autonomy in such matters" and
"should weigh all the factors that bear on legal merit, including both those
that suggest the divorce statute is obsolete and unjust and the competing fac-
tors that emphasize the presumptive validity of statutes and the presumptive
wrongfulness of peijury." Id. at 1117-18.
166. Id. at 1120.
167. See MICHAL R. BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW AND SOUTHERN ORDER:
RACIAL VIOLENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN THE POST-BROWN SOUTH
20, 25, 32, 54-55, 120-24 (1987) (discussing instances of nullification in trials
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that defined cases discussed above-official misconduct, an
unjust law, or unjust application of law-are present in these
cases. Juries apparently (and sometimes explicitly) just re-
fused to apply a statute to a defendant whose case clearly fit
under it, and whose guilt was established beyond reasonable
doubt. They did so for clear reasons of racial prejudice, 168 and
thus breached any accepted conception of the rule of law.
One observation with respect to these verdicts is that they
are not proper examples of jury nullification because the juries
themselves were illegitimate. 169  The juries rendering those
decisions themselves violated the rule of law in the manner of
their composition: African Americans were widely excluded
from jury service in southern states by numerous barriers in-
cluding voter registration restrictions and racially biased use of
peremptory strikes.170 Our contemporary conception of impar-
tial juries defines them as synonymous with representative
cross-sections of the community.171  Excluding whole racial
groups from participation in jury service (arising in large part
from exclusion from voting rolls and from biased use of unregu-
lated peremptory strikes) renders the jury unlawful. The jury's
verdict did not conform to the rule of law, but neither did the
jury itself.I" Juries drawn from the entire community likely
of white defendants charged with violence against civil rights activists in the
South in the aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education).
168. See, e.g., BELKNAP, supra note 167, at 189 (recounting trials of white
perpetrators in which white jurors were "self-proclaimed white supremacists"
and members of White Citizens Councils, two of whom noted they could not
credit the testimony of a key state witness because the witness, an informant,
had breached a Klan oath of secrecy).
169. This argument is limited to all-white juries in the American South
through the 1960s. When juries that are properly constituted and represen-
tative of their communities render nullification verdicts, this argument does
not hold.
170. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986) (holding that a defen-
dant may make a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that the
prosecutor used preemptory challenges to exclude members of his or her race
from the jury).
171. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (requiring juries to
be chosen from a fair cross section of a community); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406
U.S. 356, 373 (1972) ("The importance that our system attaches to trial by
jury derives from the special confidence we repose in a 'body of one's peers to
determine guilt or innocence .... ).
172. One might argue with Justice Marshall that such improperly consti-
tuted panels of citizens were not "juries" at all, in that a "jury" is by definition
an impartial, representative panel of citizens. See Holland v. fllinois, 493 U.S.
474, 494 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the fair-cross-section
requirement is "founded on the notion that what is denominated a 'jury' is not
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would have resulted at least in hung juries rather than com-
plete acquittals.173
Optimistically, then, one might hope that such decisions
are rare if not nonexistent among properly constituted juries.
But what if such verdicts do occur, even by legitimate juries?
There are certainly localities from which one could legally im-
panel an all-white jury using conventional methods of random
jury venire selection and peremptory strikes. 174 What if such a
jury nullifies prosecution of a guilty defendant on motivations
like those that inspired not-guilty verdicts for white defendants
in the civil rights era? More broadly, what if any jury, regard-
less of its demographic characteristics, nullifies a prosecution
based on pure prejudice or animosity rather than considera-
tions of law and principle?
Such verdicts violate the rule of law. Yet the interesting
observation comes from the circumstances in which such ver-
dicts arise. Historical examples of nullification trends, such as
those by civil-rights-era white juries in the South, seem to oc-
cur largely when local norms and sentiments strongly conflict
with statutes and principles reflecting the consensus of the
larger, national community.1 75 In such a context, abolishing
a jury' in the eyes of the Constitution unless it is drawn from a fair cross sec-
tion of the community").
173. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83
MIcH. L. REv. 1611, 1616-24 (1985) (reviewing empirical data documenting
trial outcome variations depending on race ofjurors).
174. Because juries need be representative only of the local community,
and no source of law governs the definition of the vicinage, or community of
which the jury must be representative, it is quite possible to have a represen-
tative jury in a racially homogeneous community whose members are all of
the same race.
175. But see BELKNAP, supra note 167, at 189 ("The slaying of a civil rights
worker lay outside the boundaries of that crime (of murder] as delineated 'by
the community conscience' of Alabama.") (footnote omitted); id. at 190 (noting
a difference in the attitudes of white jurors from the larger city of Montgom-
ery, Alabama, and the much smaller Lowndes County).
I do not mean to discount the effects of race and other sorts of prejudice
that affect jury verdicts in ways other than conscious, deliberate discrimina-
tion. Cognitive science theory adopted for trial practice, for instance, strongly
suggests that people have pre-formed "cognitive schema" through which they
filter and sort information in ways that include unconscious racial distinc-
tions. See Moore, supra note 104, at 278 (discussing the effect of the theory onjurors). Moreover, considerable literature by critical race theorists persua-
sively demonstrates how racialized thinking affects legal decisionmaking and
doctrinal development to the detriment of racial minorities, even though not a
product of conscious, malicious racial bias. See, e.g., Anthony Cook, Cultural
Racism and the Limits of Rationality in the Saga of Rodney King, 70 DENv. U.
L. REV. 297, 309-10 (1993) (discussing how institutional racism affected jurors
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juries, or at least their nullification power by instituting judi-
cial review of acquittals, would not solve the problem of the
collapse of the rule of law.17 6
To see why, consider the institutional alternatives to the
jury: from what other decisionmakers can we expect lawful,
less biased decisions? Many southern state and local legal in-
stitutions through the civil rights era demonstrated themselves
unable or unwilling to administer nonracist justice.177  Juries
in the trial against the officers who beat Rodney King); Crenshaw & Peller,
supra note 33, at 302-09 (discussing scientific and religious influences on cul-
tural racism); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322-23 (1987)
(attempting to explain unconscious racism through the theories of psycho-
analysis and cognitive psychology).
Analyzing unconscious racism is probably the best approach to under-
standing the first jury verdict in the trial of police officers who beat Rodney
King. Many observers view that verdict as nullification, though jurors afler
the trial insisted their verdict was based on their assessment that the state's
evidence was insufficient. The all-white jury did not deliberately decide not to
apply the law because the defendants were white and the victim black. More
likely, through mental processes insightfully described by cognitive theory
such as Moore's, they found evidence in favor of white defendants more
credible, while linking the black victim with racialized cognitive "scripts" that
diminished the persuasiveness of the state's case. See Moore, supra note 104,
at 278 (attempting to explain "schematic information processing" through
which people remember information and events). For a related but different
explanation of the Rodney King verdict, see Crenshaw & Peller, supra note 33,
at 291 (arguing that the rule of law was not "subverted" but "interpreted" be-
cause "terms that guarantee the rule of law.., are necessarily indeterminate.
Their meaning must be socially constructed through narratives of place and
time .... ).
176. The question is a closer one than it may seem when we compare this
historical set of nullification verdicts with the pattern of acquittals under the
Fugitive Slave Act or in response to capital prosecutions for property crimes
under the English "Bloody Code." See supra note 115 (discussing these types
of jury nullification). Those, I would suggest, demonstrate a much broader
based popular sentiment at odds with governing powers or the ruling elite, as
opposed to a regional community's opposition to national sentiment. The
question may be a close enough one, though, or that distinction slim enough,
that the difference is ultimately one of moral viewpoint or substantive princi-
ple: the southern acquittals were illegitimate because they were racist, while
the Slave Act or capital crime acquittals were lawful because they were based
on a moral commitment we agree should inform our law.
177. Belknap explains:
Southern courts were little better at protecting civil rights activists
than were southern police officers. As late as 1963 they remained al-
most totally white institutions. Sitting in segregated courtrooms, white
judges and white juries dispensed racially biased justice. In Danville,
pistol-packing Judge Archibald Aiken ... combated disorder by en-
joining nonviolent demonstrations .... Like Aiken, many southernjudges seemed to view themselves "less as impartial umpires and dis-
pensers oflustice than as defenders of white supremacy."
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were only one manifestation of biased decisions arising from
immoral local norms. Local judges, as well as law enforcement
officials and prosecutors, demonstrated equally blatant racial
bias.178 Judges violated the rule of law roughly as much as ju-
ries.179  Southern justice administration during that period
demonstrates not that juries are a particularly bias-prone de-
cisionmaker, but that the rule of law is contingent upon a po-
litical and moral culture, including popular culture, for its exis-
tence. It demonstrates, in other words, that recent reconceptions
of the rule of law from a formalist, rules-oriented notion to one of
a legal system integrated with and a product of social practices,
are descriptively accurate. Formal rules against murder and
assault were insufficient to ensure the rule of law in the South.
Neither does the formal structure of institutions-employing a
trained judge or lay jurors, for instance-guarantee (or seem-
ingly even greatly improve the odds for) meaningful rule of
law.
Such examples of judges failing to work within the rule of
law do not give rise to arguments for abolishing judges or for
restructuring their authority.180 It is not clear, then, why oc-
casional instances of unjustifiable nullification should call into
BELKNAP, supra note 167, at 120-21 (emphasis added); see also id. at 121
(noting that out of the 26 killings of blacks or white civil rights workers be-
tween 1960 and 1965, only one perpetrator was convicted, of manslaughter;
all others "were either not arrested, not indicted, or not convicted"); id. at 32("Far from cracking down on racial violence that followed Brown, some south-
ern authorities aided and abetted it."); id. at 55 (recounting the story of a
Birmingham judge who sentenced defendants who pled guilty to bombing a
church to one year probation); id. at 99-100 (discussing collaboration of Bir-
mingham police with the Ku Klux Klan to further racial violence); id. at 118-
24 (discussing many specific occasions in which local police in southern towns
committed illegal violence, failed to arrest perpetrators of violence against
civil rights activists and African Americans, or collaborated with private citi-
zens to commit violence); id. at 187 (recounting a county prosecutor's refusal
to prosecute a deputy sheriff who killed one civil rights activist and injured
another with a shotgun).
178. See id. at 120-21 (describing several stories of unprosecuted violence
against blacks and civil rights workers).
179. More broadly, there is a strong argument arising from the observation
of trial lawyers that many local judges occasionally (or even regularly) enterjudgments outside the rule of law-judges who, for instance, refuse to enforce
the exclusionary rule for illegal searches or improperly obtained inculpatory
statements. Most such observations are hard to prove or quantify, but then so
are most claims of nullification.
180. They do give rise, though, to reforms that substitute other judges and
prosecutors to handle matters consistently mishandled by local officials; the
failure of southern states to administer a race-blind rule of law prompted ex-
pansion of federal jurisdiction and law enforcement in the South.
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question the jury's legitimacy or the scope of its unreviewable
authority. One might again make a prudential argument: the
odds are better that judges will more often adhere to the rule of
law than that juries will. That claim, I suggest, is simply not
substantiated and probably arises from the distorting nature of
anecdotal evidence; instances of seemingly egregious jury nul-
lification attract attention more readily than judicial deci-
sions.181 There is a class of nullification verdicts that violates
the rule of law; decisions by southern white juries are one ex-
ample of that class. Closely examined, however, those in-
stances are likely to involve circumstances in which the rule of
law would fail regardless of juries' involvement. It fails not for
lack of authority by legally trained jurists, but for lack of a
supportive, sustaining political and moral culture.182
E. AN ADDITIONAL OBSERVATION FROM THE CAPITAL MURDER
CASES
Death penalty sentencing has remained a particularly
problematic decision for the jury in particular and the Ameri-
can criminal justice system generally. The U.S. Supreme
Court briefly declared capital punishment unconstitutional,
but a few years later permitted its resumption under a complex
doctrinal regime of guided discretion for juries.183 It is fair to
say that the consensus opinion on two decades of capital sen-
181. But see STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIvIL JURIES AND THE
POLrrics OF REFORM 17-21 (1995) (comparing the "rhetoric," built in part on
distorted anecdotes, that insists civil juries have increasingly produced ex-
cessively large verdicts for tort plaintiffs with empirical evidence that indi-
cates no such trend or bias has occurred).
182. In more critical terms, the rule of law fails at such moments because
the narratives through which legal participants give content to formal legal
terms were strategically constructed in opposition to racial equality, so that
even seemingly strong, core dictates of the rule of law proved ineffective when
interpreted and applied by officials opposed to the social change sought by
civil rights activism. See Crenshaw & Peller, supra note 83, at 285-91
(attempting to explain the Rodney King verdict) "[F]ormal prohibitions ... are
necessarily mediated through narrative structures," id. at 285, such that so-
cial events like whites' attacks on civil rights activists no more speak for
themselves to invoke criminal law as a protection than did "the baton
against... Rodney King's skull" in the first trial of King's arresting officers.
Id. at 291.
183. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240 (1972) (declaring the death
penalty as applied in Georgia unconstitutional under the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments). But see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976)
(reinstating the death penalty by approving certain procedures as constitu-
tional); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) (finding Texas death penalty
procedures constitutional).
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tencing since Gregg v. Georgia is that the new approach has
not significantly reduced the arbitrariness with which defen-
dants are selected for the death penalty.'84
If that arbitrariness is so great that it violates the rule of
law, juries may bear some responsibility for that violation. Af-
ter all, juries make the capital sentencing decision in most
states (and play an advisory role in decision in most others).
As the prior section clarified, it is not the thesis of this Article
that jury decisions are always lawful. One might argue, then,
that juries contravene the rule of law by improperly imposing
the death penalty in some cases, and improperly "nullify" 185 a
capital sentence in others (imposing a life sentence instead).
That argument loses force, however, with the recognition
that one cannot blame the jury without first controlling for the
variety of actors and circumstances that contribute to arbitrary
capital sentence outcomes. There is strong empirical evidence
that prosecutorial discretion contributes more significantly to
disproportionate capital sentences across classes of defendant
groups than jury discretion does.8 6 Moreover, jury decision-
making is fundamentally affected by the litigation resources
and skills each side brings to trial. Evidence indicates that
impoverished defendants and others with legal counsel of
minimal skill, competence, or resources disproportionately re-
ceive death sentences.187 Those outcomes may have little to do
with either the jury's competency or its fully informed choice to
184. See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting) (concluding that the Court cannot ensure fairness in the administra-
tion of the death penalty by attempting to establish procedural rules and sub-
stantive regulations); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second
Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital
Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REv. 355, 360 (1995) (noting that the Court's regu-
lations regarding the death penalty create "an impression of enormous regula-
tory effort but achieved negligible regulatory effects").
185. I put "nullify" in quotation marks because, if the capital sentencing
decision is discretionary, then a jury is not nullifying in the sense of returning
a verdict other than one the law requires.
186. David C. Baldus et al., Reflections on the "Inevitability" of Racial Dis-
crimination in Capital Sentencing and the "Impossibility" of its Prevention,
Detection, and Correction, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 359, 366 (1994) (recounting
empirical evidence that discriminatory "race-of-victim effects were principally
the product of prosecutorial plea-bargaining decisions and prosecutorial deci-
sions to seek death sentences in death-eligible cases").
187. See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not
for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1837 (1994)
(describing the "pervasiveness of deficient representation" in death penalty
cases).
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arbitrarily impose the death penalty in contravention of the
rule of law. Other factors and decisionmakers in the criminal
justice system contribute to a system whose arbitrariness con-
travenes the rule of law, but the jury cannot be blamed for con-
tributing to that arbitrariness when it renders a verdict on im-
perfect information and inadequate argument in a class of
cases already improperly narrowed as death-eligible. 88
CONCLUSION
Those who condemn all nullification verdicts face the
challenge not only of providing a supportive account of the rule
of law, but also of explaining why we do not either limit juries
solely to the task of finding facts or make their decisions sub-
ject to appellate review. 189 In their interpretation of instruc-
tions, juries tilt application of general rules toward particular-
ized justice. They know less of the law than judges but
arguably more of the social norms and practices that may in-
form law's application. This equity function mediates the insti-
tutions of law, which apply general rules to individual cases
that do not all fit a given rule equally well. 190
We choose juries over judges for many of the same reasons
that we have revised our understanding of the rule of law it-
self. Jury decisionmaking is expected to be less legalistic and
more infused with localized, lay notions of justice, just as the
contemporary reconception of the rule of law seeks to move law
from mechanical, uncontextualized application of general rules.
There are fears about both moves, of course. Legalistic ar-
rangements and trained judges are supposed to yield outcomes
more rational and consistent, less idiosyncratic and biased.
Even though rules aspire to suppress decision maker bias, 191
188. This is not to say that juries, like all other players, are not affected in
their finding or analysis of facts, and their interpretation of law, by uncon-
scious patterns of bias that substantively affect case outcomes. See supra
note 175 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of unconscious racism
on juries).
189. Andrew Leipold has recently made a strong argument for review of
criminal jury verdicts. See Leipold, supra note 1, at 284-310 (criticizing the
doctrines that allow jury nullification).
190. Criminal laws are general rules; to deny a role for jury nullification is
to assume that general rules never yield unjust results in particular cases
that will not be prevented by prosecutors (or perhaps also executive clem-
ency). See Sunstein, supra note 50, at 1008-12 (discussing "legitimate rule
reversion" such as nullification in some cases).
191. See id. at 972 ("By adopting rules, people can also overcome their own
myopia, weakness of will, confusion, venality, or bias in individual cases.").
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the disadvantages of a legalistic, rule-based system are suffi-
cient to prompt a preference for an untrained, lay jury that will
temper the application of general rules with particularized no-
tions of equity and the input of broader norms and princi-
ples.'92 The same disadvantage motivates continuing discus-
sion of alternatives to unwavering rule application in legal
reasoning generally. 193 The goal of both the new rule of law
ideals and of jury adjudication is to encourage a search for, to
use Rawls's phrase, reflective equilibrium between the com-
mand of general rules and our "considered judgments" about
correct outcomes in particular cases. 194 Because general rules
always leave gaps, we want to mediate their application with
more individualized case assessments. But we want juries to
think hard about general rule application before rejecting or
modifying in light of a more instinctual moral intuition about
correct outcomes. We want them to nullify, in Kadish's words,
only for a "damned good reason."195 We want them to presume
application of positive law is correct, and nullify only for strong
reasons arising from sources we consider within the rule of
law.196
Our ambivalence about jury authority also works to en-
courage nullification only in compelling cases. Juries are not
told of their power to nullify; they may be told that they must
obey and apply the law given to them by the judge. Yet we re-
ject any remedy (like judicial review) for nullification verdicts.
We discourage nullification at the same time we preserve it.
Nullification is illicit yet strongly protected. This contradiction
works as a strategic compromise: juries sometimes figure out
their nullification power and choose to use it, but their lack of
explicit knowledge presumably serves to encourage them to re-
192. Cf. Paul D. Gewirtz, On 'IKnow It When ISee It," 105 YALE L.J. 1023,
1035 n.42 (1996) (favorably discussing "nonrational" considerations in legal
reasoning and arguing that what we fear about excessive rationality is
asimplification and aloofness, creating decisionmaking stripped of a full un-
derstanding of its implications").
193. See generally Sunstein, supra note 52, at 767 (examining alternatives
to "analogical reasoning" which is often used in legal reasoning); Sunstein, su-
pra note 50, at 1006-20 (discussing reform to rule application).
194. See RAWLS, supra note 28, at 19-21, 46-51 (discussing the relationship
between the two concepts).
195. See KADISH & KADISH, supra note 68, at 62; see also Sunstein, supra
note 50, at 972 (indicating that rules minimize informational and political
costs, and individual bias or confusion, in particular cases).
196. Cf. Schauer, supra note 37, at 647 (describing his thesis of "presumptive
positivism").
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serve it for the most serious cases. 97 In many of those cases,
nullification occurs within the rule of law, because the circum-
stances that prompt a jury to go beyond its explicit instructions
are often grave matters of justice arising from a great disparity
between the statute or its application and other sources of law
and social convention. These are damned good reasons, and
reasons found within acknowledged sources of law. Those
cases are usually ones in which other institutions and officials
have failed to uphold the rule of law, and the jury's nullifica-
tion verdict is the last resort for correcting or condemning such
breaches. Far from leading to anarchy, 198 many nullification
decisions arise in compelling circumstances that convince
twelve citizens, inclined to follow the law, unanimously to ig-
nore literal statute application. It likely signals failure of law
either by other institutional players or broadly within a soci-
ety.
Nullification (like the exclusionary rule) is a blunt and im-
perfect mechanism for addressing rule of law concerns. Refus-
ing to convict does not punish perjurers or illegal searches and
seizures; it does not repeal bad statutes like the Fugitive Slave
Act; it does not force change in biased criminal justice admini-
stration. Yet it may help prompt correction of those errors, and
we can see how it does so lawfully. We label such acquittal
verdicts "nullification" because they reject literal application of
the statute under which a defendant is charged. But our con-
ception and practice of the rule of law is necessarily much
broader and richer, and nullification, for the right reasons, fits
within it.
197. The empirical evidence is inconclusive that giving jurors no instruc-
tion regarding nullification has this effect. See Horowitz, The Impact of Judi-
cial Instructions, supra note 113, at 450 (discussing the effect of nullification
instructions).
198. But see, e.g., United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1133-34
(D.C. Cir. 1972) ("[Nullification's] explicit avowal risks the ultimate logic of
anarchy ..... 'No legal system could long survive if it gave every individual the
option of disregarding with impunity any law which by his personal standard
was judged morally untenable.'") (citing United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d
1002, 1009 (4th Cir. 1969)).
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